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By  
Deven R. Desai and Sandra L. Rierson 
 
Recent lawsuits and articles have drawn attention to a growing issue in 
intellectual property law, the aggressive and arguably abusive tactics of intellectual 
property (“IP”) rights holders. Indeed in the trademark context, some maintain and there 
are arguments to support the idea that trademark holders bring these actions as a means of 
manipulating the public through direct control of the public’s ability to use language. 
Nonetheless, if one supposes for a moment that trademark holders and their counsel are 
acting at some level of good faith and are rational, it may be that something else in the 
law itself drives this otherwise questionable behavior. This paper argues that the doctrine 
of genericism—under which a court may determine a previously valuable mark is or has 
become generic, thus losing all trademark status and value—as it is currently applied 
forces the trademark holder to police her rights in this extreme manner for fear of losing 
her mark. 
Specifically, this paper investigates the theoretical and historical evolution of the 
doctrine and posits that current genericism doctrine has strayed far from its roots, which 
are in consumer understanding in the marketplace and enhancing competition, and now 
concerns itself with an inappropriate property type of analysis that places great weight on 
non-commercial and/or non-competitive trademark use contexts (e.g., dictionary entries, 
newspapers, noncompetitive third-party uses, etc.). This focus leads to inefficient results, 
i.e., trademark holders engaging in extensive advertising, letter campaigns, and litigation 
to try to protect the mark and prevent it from being deemed generic.  
As such this paper argues that the doctrine should be re-anchored to focus on the 
mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the consumer in commercial contexts. Re-
focusing genericism on consumer contexts rather than non-consumer, expressive contexts 
will allow the analysis to embrace a more sophisticated, broad understanding of 
trademarks. This approach recognizes a term’s ability to perform more than one function 
in language depending on the user of the term and the context of the term’s use (i.e., 
commercial and non-commercial). In addition, this revised understanding of genericism 
would undermine trademark holders’ ability to claim the need to engage in what would 
otherwise be frivolous and/or abusive enforcement strategies, because they could no 
longer hang their collective hat on the excuse that they were required to do so to avoid 
falling victim to genericism. In short, this retooling of the doctrine would allow 
trademark owners to enjoy the full benefits of the source identifying functions of their 
marks while at the same time creating a space in which the public may enjoy full use of 
the terms without fear of reprisal by mark owners. 
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Confronting the Genericism Conundrum†
By  
Deven R. Desai‡ and Sandra L. Rierson
Introduction 
Do you Yahoo!?  Did you Google someone or something today?  Use a Kleenex?  
If so, how did you understand the terms Yahoo!, Google, or Kleenex?  Did they mean a 
general experience or product or did they signify a specific product or service?  Maybe 
the significance depended on the context in which you used the term.  If you were buying 
tissue, you may have meant specifically Kleenex,1 or you may have used the term to 
mean any tissue, or you may have meant the term to be both. That is, you may have 
thought, “I need Kleenex” (substituting the term for tissue), reached the aisle with tissues, 
and then discerned between Kleenex tissue and its competitors because at that point—the 
commercial point—the brand2 mattered to you. 
Insofar as you used any of the terms in a general way to indicate a product or 
service class rather than a specific product or service, one group would be quite upset. 
That group is the trademark holders, because such uses may lead to a finding that the 
 
† This article has benefited from the encouragement and feedback of David Barnes, Barton Beebe, Tom 
Bell, Irene Calboli, Stacey Dogan, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Brett Frischmann, Mark Lemley, and Shaun Martin. 
We also received helpful comments from the participants in the IP Scholars August 2005 conference hosted 
by Cardozo School of Law and the participants in the 2005 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property 
Colloquium co-hosted by Washington University School of Law and Saint Louis University School of 
Law.  We are also indebted to Chelsea Hueth and Aimee McLeod for their invaluable research assistance. 
‡ Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. 
 Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. 
1 Note that, when using Microsoft Word, typing “kleenex” with a lower case “k” causes the autocorrect 
function to capitalize the word to signify that it is a proper noun.  
2 The terms “trademark,” “mark,” and “brand” are used interchangeably throughout this article.  Although 
almost anything may function as a trademark (e.g., color, smell, sound), this article focuses on word marks 
and the way they function as part of language.  See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 
U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that the green and gold color of dry cleaning press pads was a protectable 
trademark); Id. at 162 (noting the registration of NBC’s three chimes as a trademark); In re Clarke, 17 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1238, 1240 (T.T.A.B 1990) (allowing registration of plumeria blossom-fragranced thread); In 
re General Electric Broadcasting Co., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (ringing made by "ship's bell 
clock" registrable with acquired distinctiveness). 
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trademark has become generic. Once a term is deemed generic, that is, the general term 
used to refer to a product or service category, the formerly valuable mark loses its ability 
to function as a trademark. When that happens, the mark, which may have been highly 
valuable to the trademark holder, becomes essentially worthless.  
As one can imagine, trademark holders who invest considerable sums of money in 
developing and protecting their marks do not wish to find their marks deemed generic. 
Rather, a company’s marketing goal is to build brand dominance to the point of ubiquity, 
so that the brand is the first thing on a consumer’s mind when considering a purchase of a 
particular type of good.3 Further, the brand identifies the company and/or its products for 
the consumer, and ideally conveys (hopefully positive) information as well.  Put 
differently, the trademark holder’s goal is to build and maintain consumer awareness of 
the trademark so that consumers come to see the trademark as a sign of “consistent 
source and quality.”4 Indeed, one of the touchstones of trademark law is the idea that 
“[t]he value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible by the information 
or reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand. . . .”5
Thus, in this paper we address the related concepts of genericism and genericide. 
We use the term “genericism” to refer to the over-arching doctrine applied by courts to 
determine whether a word or term should be deemed “generic” and hence incapable of 
 
3 On brand building and its importance in general, see WILLIAM J. MCEWEN, MARRIED TO THE BRAND 
(2005); see also MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN & NEIL FISKE, TRADING UP: WHY CONSUMERS WANT NEW 
LUXURY GOODS AND HOW COMPANIES CREATE THEM (2005).   
4 Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark 
Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 789 (1997). 
5 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265, 270 (1987) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective]; accord 
Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163-64 ("[T]rademark law. . . reduces the customer's costs of shopping and 
making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item 
with this mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or 
disliked) in the past.") (emphasis in original and internal citations omitted. 
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functioning as a trademark.  Genericide is really a subset of genericism and refers to the 
process by which a mark that was once highly valuable and unquestionably protectable 
loses all trademark status and value.  As such, genericism encompasses genericide but 
also covers broader issues related to this area of trademark law.  Both doctrines have 
flaws that lead to incoherence, inefficiencies, and undesirable behaviors. 
Under current trademark doctrine a business person may choose an arguably 
descriptive mark—one which describes the attributes of the product or service to which it 
is attached—and invest in her mark so that it acquires secondary meaning. When that 
occurs the term is considered source identifying and thus can be a trademark. Yet under 
current genericism doctrine, the same mark holder may discover that the mark is 
considered “generic” and hence invalid only after creating goodwill associated with the 
mark. 
Business owners who chose arbitrary or fanciful names face an inverse problem. 
Arbitrary or fanciful marks such as Xerox or Yahoo! do not need to develop secondary 
meaning; such terms are source-identifying at the outset (i.e., inherently distinctive). Still, 
that source identifying quality can be lost, if the mark is used in a manner that eliminates 
its distinctiveness.6 Thus under the doctrine of genericide mark holders are required to 
“police” their marks and failure to do so may lead to a court finding that the source-
identifying function of the mark no longer exists.7 However, under the current doctrine 
not only uses by competitors in commercial contexts can show that the mark has lost its 
 
6 Section 45 of the Lanham Act provides that “[a] mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ . . . [w]hen any 
course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to 
become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used. . . .”  15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (2005). 
7 Id.; see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Nationalizing Trademarks: A New International Trademark 
Jurisprudence?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 740 & n.40 (2004) (discussing trademark policing). 
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source-identifying quality; uses by non-competitors in expressive or informative contexts 
(such as newspapers or dictionaries) are taken as evidence of the death of the mark. This 
approach poses serious problems because it requires (or, at the very least, encourages) 
trademark holders to pursue expensive and perhaps harmful if not quixotic strategies, 
ranging from letter campaigns to lawsuits, to attempt to control the manner in which 
society uses language.  If mark holders do not try to prevent these expressive, non-
commercial uses, a court may rely on such evidence to show that the mark has morphed 
from a valuable intellectual property asset into a communal term with no value as a mark. 
These policing efforts by trademark holders may impinge on another important 
interest:  the public’s ability to use and adapt language as it sees fit.8 Much has been 
written about the arguably abusive tactics of trademark holders who aggressively enforce 
their rights.9 Indeed, in the trademark context some maintain—and there are arguments 
to support—that trademark holders attempt to manipulate the public through direct 
control of the public’s ability to use language.10 Those wishing to protect the expressive 
aspects of language assert that speech interests should trump a mark holder’s ability to 
control and protect her mark from public uses, even uses that under current doctrine 
could lead to the term losing its value as a mark.11 
8 See notes 234-245 and accompanying text. 
9 See e.g., K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine—
Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y.
609 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 
(2005). 
10 See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 406-410 (1990) (tracing the shift to a pure property approach to 
trademark rights and noting the way in which this shift limits the potential for expressive use of 
trademarks); Greene, supra note 9 (suggesting limitations to curb abusive trademark litigation practices). 
11 See Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 418-19 (arguing that when a term is required for expressive needs and no 
other term is available that use must be allowed).  
- -6
We argue that these explanations, at best, do not tell the whole story. If we are to 
address the problems caused by current genericism doctrine and its apparently attendant 
abusive trademark litigation, we should understand the issue from both sides of the fence:  
First, what is the mark holder’s perspective regarding trademark protections? Second, 
what is the history of and rationale behind genericism doctrine? Third, when must speech 
interests (if ever) trump a mark holder’s ability to control and protect her mark?  By 
investigating these areas it appears that genericism doctrine may be redeemable such that 
both trademark and speech interests may be satisfied. 
Specifically, this paper posits that current methods for determining whether a term 
is generic—a line-drawing process that attempts to classify words and terms 
etymologically as either a “genus” (generic) or a “species” (a protectable trademark)12—
grant undue weight to non-commercial and/or non-competitive trademark use contexts 
(e.g., dictionary entries and newspapers)13 and thus stray far from trademark’s roots in 
source identification analysis.  Moreover, the current doctrine fails to examine how 
affording the term trademark status will impact competition, to the detriment of both 
consumers and potential mark holders. This approach causes incoherence and uncertainty 
leading to inefficiencies.  
As such we contend that the genericism doctrine should be re-anchored to focus on 
the mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the consumer in commercial contexts. 
By refocusing the genericism question on consumer contexts rather than non-consumer 
contexts the doctrine may better reflect a term’s ability to perform more than one function 
in language, depending on the user of the term and the context of the term’s use.  In 
 
12 See notes 164-167 and accompanying text, infra.
13 These issues are discussed in Section II, infra.
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addition, refocusing the doctrine on the mark’s ability to act as a source-identifier in a 
commercial context—while considering the effect of trademark protection on 
competition—would provide businesspeople with greater clarity regarding what 
constitutes a protectable mark and what types of usage may contribute to a mark’s 
demise.  Furthermore, this approach allows and encourages mark holders to expend 
resources on developing goodwill and the source-identifying properties of their marks 
rather than wasting resources on currently required yet largely impotent campaigns to 
protect their marks from what should be considered fair use.  Finally, this revised 
understanding of genericism would undermine trademark holders’ ability to claim the 
need to engage in what would otherwise be frivolous and/or abusive enforcement 
strategies, because they could no longer hang their collective hat on the excuse that they 
were required to do so to avoid falling victim to genericide.  As such, this retooling of the 
doctrine allows trademark holders to enjoy the full benefits of the source-identifying 
functions of their marks, while creating a space in which the public may enjoy full use of 
the terms without fear of reprisal by mark holders. 
Section I of this article explains the clash of interests that underlie the genericism 
conundrum. It begins with an explanation of trademark value from a business 
perspective, as supported by the law and economics understanding of trademark law.  
Next, the section explains and then investigates the language and speech theories of how 
people use trademarks and how trademarks function expressively, beyond the 
commercial context. Section II provides some fundamentals of trademark taxonomy and 
traces the evolution of the genericism doctrine. Section III examines the way in which the 
doctrine currently operates and identifies the ways in which the doctrine is inefficient 
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and/or ineffectual in promoting the core purposes of trademark law.  Section IV sets forth 
a modest proposal for the reform of the doctrine, focusing on (1) a putative trademark’s 
ability to function as a source-identifier in the relevant marketplace, and (2) the 
competitive effect of extending trademark protection. 
 
I. Why Genericism Matters 
This section begins by first presenting why trademarks (AKA brands) are so 
important to business.  From there the section examines the theoretical underpinnings of 
trademark law.  By analyzing the law and economics, free speech, and linguistic theories 
related to trademarks, this section seeks to show how—rather than conflicting—these 
theoretical presentations provide a framework for unraveling the problems currently seen 
in the genericism doctrine. 
 
A. The Power of the Brand 
 
In the debate regarding the extent of trademark holders’ rights versus the public’s 
need to use language freely, the trademark holders’ perspective can be lost. Ignoring this 
story fails to appreciate the real interests that mark holders and the economy have in 
protecting marks. While some argue—and certain trademark holders’ behaviors support 
the idea—that mark holders engage in abusive rights enforcement,14 analysis of the 
problem must not focus solely on the negative aspects of holding and enforcing a 
trademark. To do so presupposes bad faith on the trademark holder’s part and requires 
 
14 See generally Greene, supra note 9.  
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one to believe that mark holders and their attorneys engage in overly aggressive 
enforcement strategies merely to vex the public and to commandeer language.  A 
comprehensive critique of genericism and genericide must recognize that trademarks are 
powerful tools in a company’s economic arsenal.15 Indeed, much of a company’s value 
and potential for long-term growth can be traced to its brand value.16 These facts explain 
some of trademark holders’ behaviors and why the law must protect the value of 
trademarks.  
Trademarks and brands play an important role in a company’s ability to generate 
capital.  Marketing theorists opine that “[p]erhaps the most distinctive skill of 
professional marketers is their ability to create, maintain, protect, and enhance brands. ”17 
Marketers typically define “brand equity” as “the price premium the brand commands 
times the extra volume it moves over an average brand.”18 The value of a brand is 
expressed when a company realizes a net worth greater than its tangible asset value.19 
Brands can be so powerful that some companies employ a strategy of purchasing 
other companies merely to build a brand portfolio, as evidenced by Nestle’s $4.5 billion 
 
15 See generally KLAUS JENNWEIN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY-
BRANDS IN THE APPROPRIATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (2005) (presenting a theory of how 
brand-equity and technology assets interact to allow companies to extract value from initial technological 
investments). 
16See Warren E. Buffet, The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1, 173 (1997) (selected, arranged, and introduced by Lawrence E. Cunningham). 
17 PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 404 (2000).  Kotler defines a brand as “a name, trademark, 
logo, or other symbol.”  Id. 
18 Id. at 405. Valuation of a brand, however, is subjective at best, as evidenced by the numerous other brand 
valuation methods used in the marketing industry. A direct measure approach adds up the investment of 
capital into the brand and adjusts for inflation.  Jacques Chevron, Valuing Brands, on Paper and in Truth,
BRANDWEEK, Jan. 17, 2000, at 24. While this method is perhaps the easiest, it penalizes brands that do not 
heavily advertise. The brand awareness method contrasts the percentage of targeted customers who have 
tried the product versus customers that regularly purchase the product. Comparing this figure to the overall 
advertising budget results in a more conservative valuation of the brand than any other method. Id.
19 For an extended investigation of the relationship between brand-equity and intangible assets, see 
generally JENNWEIN, supra note 15.  
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purchase of Rowntree, a price that was five times Rowntree’s book value.20 Warren 
Buffet explains his company’s purchase of See’s Candy for $25 million—despite a book 
value of $8 million—as based on See’s Candy’s economic goodwill; in other words, the 
$17 million premium was for the “excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired.”21 As 
Buffet explains: 
Relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after tax 
on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s. . . .  It was not the fair market value 
of the inventories, receivable or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of 
return. Rather it was a combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive 
favorable reputation with consumers based on countless pleasant experiences that 
they have had with both product and personnel.22 
The “goodwill” described by Buffet above—the “pervasive favorable reputation 
with consumers based on countless pleasant experiences that they have had with both 
product and personnel”—demonstrates in part why brands may be so highly valued.  It 
does not, however, tell the entire story.  Marketers also encourage the public to build 
identities and form emotional bonds with brands:  “A brand can also create a connection 
by serving as a ‘badge,’ or an outward sign that tells the world something about the buyer 
or the user.”23 Similarly, Professor Barton Beebe writes that “consumers consume 
 
20 KOTLER, supra note 17, at 405. 
21 See Buffet, supra note 16, at 172-73. 
22 See id. at 173 (emphasis added).  Other examples of payment for brand-equity include when U.K.-based 
GrandMet acquired Pillsbury, likely paying just short of $1 billion, or 88% of the purchase price, to acquire 
the Pillsbury brands, including Green Giant, Old El Paso, and Haagen-Dazs; and BMW’s purchase of the 
Rolls-Royce brand name from Volkswagen for $65 million.  Chevron, supra note 18, at 24; see also 
William Diem, BMW Gains Rolls-Royce Brand After All, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, August 3, 1998, at 25. More 
recently, communications giant SBC paid $16 billion to keep the AT&T brand when the two companies 
merged, because AT&T as a brand is “deeply rooted in the American consumer psyche”.  Jon Britton, 
former SBC spokesman, has stated that the new advertising campaign to push the AT&T brand would be 
the largest in the history of either company.  SBC Starting All Over with the Name Game, THE SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Nov. 23, 2005, at C1.  
23 See MCEWEN, supra note 3, at  36.  McEwen lists five ways this symbolic function can manifest itself: as 
a sign of prestige (e.g., the status of wearing a Rolex watch), personal quality (e.g., youth for Pepsi or 
competitive excellence in Nike), membership (e.g., the club-like aspect of owning a Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle), memory trigger (e.g., associating a food brand with family tradition), and/or self-completion 
(e.g., brands consumers see as signs of self-completion such as Marlboro as a sign of being a rugged man 
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trademarks to signal status .…  The culture industries. . . have long sold trademarks as 
commodities in their own right.”24 
The power of brands to serve a symbolic, expressive function translates into 
market value.  Brands can become symbols by which people define and express 
themselves, such that people spend money far beyond the cost of the utility of the good to 
reinforce that identity or have that means of expression.25 Professor Beebe argues that 
“[e]ntire areas of trademark doctrine cannot be understood except as systems of rules 
designed to facilitate the commodification—indeed, the ‘industrial production’—of social 
distinction.”26 Although this trend may be viewed as both inefficient and exploitative of 
the consumer, others have argued that the pervasive use of brands not only benefits the 
brand holder, but also serves a valuable community-building function in modern 
society.27 
or L’Oreal as sign of being worth spending extra for oneself).  Id. at 36-38.  For an excellent account of 
how Nike built its brand, see generally DONALD KATZ, JUST DO IT: THE NIKE SPIRIT IN THE CORPORATE 
WORLD (1994). 
24Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (2004). 
25 See SILVERSTEIN & FISKE, supra note 3.  Some argue that such expenditures are not irrational because, 
when trademarks function properly, a consumer may wish to expend greater resources on a given brand 
despite knowing that it is identical to a competitor’s cheaper good in constituent materials, because the 
consumer wishes to ensure that the materials are assembled in a certain way that assures some specific type 
of quality. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK 
LAW 174 [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW]; see also 
Shahar Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting ‘Irrational Beliefs’, Law and 
Technology Scholarship (March 21, 2006) (Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Paper No. 19; 
available at the eScholarship Repository, University of California, http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/lts/19), 
at 13-19. 
26 Beebe, supra note 24, at 624. 
27 Friedman writes that “the value-expressive dimension of brand names suggests that brand name usage 
performs a valuable social function by engendering feelings of community on the part of those who share 
brand identification. This facilitation of group affiliation seems especially important in light of the loss of 
community that is said to commonly accompany life in complex societies such as contemporary America.”  
Monroe Friedman, The Changing Language of Consumer Society: Brand Name Usage in Popular 
American Novels in the Postwar Era, 11 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 927, 936 (1985); see also 
Dilbary, supra note 25 (arguing that “Snobbery”— consumer brand preference— benefits both consumers 
and producers and is economically efficient).  For an investigation of the reciprocal nature of language, 
culture, and society, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984). 
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For all of these reasons trademarks or brands may be extremely valuable—in fact, 
a company’s brand may be its most valuable asset. Business Week’s annual global brand 
report ranks the top one hundred global brands by dollar value, estimating the amount the 
brand is likely to earn in the future.28 Since Business Week first published the Global 
Brand Scoreboard in 2001, the three top-ranked brands have remained steady:  Coca-
Cola, Microsoft and IBM, valued at $67.5 billion, $59.9 billion and $53.3 billion, 
respectively.29 
Although the above figures are based in part on subjective factors and therefore 
their accuracy is open to debate,30 they undoubtedly demonstrate that companies have a 
lot to lose when it comes to their brands—particularly the most famous31 ones.  Not 
surprisingly, companies vigorously seek to protect these assets.  In a corporate setting 
failure to pursue any and all possible threats to a brand would arguably be a breach of 
fiduciary duty.  For if a brand is an intangible asset, like any asset it can drop in value just 
as easily as it can rise.  Genericide poses the ultimate threat, as it can reduce the value of 
the billion-dollar mark to zero.  
 
B. The Traditional Law and Economics Explanation of Brand Value 
 
28 Global Brands, BUSINESS WEEK, July 2005, at 90.   
29 Id.
30 Branding consultant Interbrand (which provides data for Business Week’s annual report) estimates brand 
value by projecting five years of earnings and sales, minus operating costs, taxes and charges for the capital 
employed. The strength of the brand is also assessed by factoring market leadership, stability, and global 
reach.  Id. Other brand valuation methodologies exist, which may reach significantly different conclusions 
regarding the value of identical brands.  See, e.g., John Willman, Valued Measure of Success:  Managing 
brands is no easy task but a new ranking brings science to a black art, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, at 1 
(unveiling BrandZ Top 100, prepared by Millard Brown Optimor, which values IBM brand at $36.1 billion, 
compared to Interbrand IBM valuation of $53.4 billion; noting other differences as well); see also note 18, 
supra.
31 “Famous” is a term of art in trademark dilution law.  The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)—
which provides broad protection of trademarks against “diluting” uses that do not cause a likelihood of 
consumer confusion—protects only “famous” trademarks.  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(A-H).  See notes 246-
257 and accompanying text, infra, discussing the link between the dilution and genericide doctrines. 
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The law and economics movement offers one explanation for why trademarks 
may be so highly valued, at least when they function efficiently.  Given that the courts 
have largely adopted the law and economics analysis of trademarks as the primary 
justification for their existence, we turn here to a brief description of the traditional 
doctrine.  
The classic economic rationale behind trademark law is that trademarks should be 
protected because they are economically efficient; trademarks help to minimize 
consumers’ search costs, the pre-purchase analysis a consumer performs to make her 
purchase decision.32 William Landes and Richard Posner set forth the idea as follows: 
“[A] trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need 
not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is 
a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I 
enjoyed earlier.’”33 These principles relate to a trademark’s function as a source-
identifier.34  
32 Ralph Folsom & Larry Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1335 (1980); accord,
Stephen Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 89 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of 
Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 729-30 (2004). 
33Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, supra note 5, at 268-270; see also Folsom 
& Teply, supra note 32, at 1336 ( “A properly functioning trademark provides a short-hand means of 
associating currently tendered products with past or anticipated experiences and thereby eliminates the need 
to make repeated searches for nonprice information.”).  
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; accord 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 3.1 (4th ed. 2005) (“to become a ‘trademark’ is to identify the source of one seller's goods 
and distinguish that source from other sources”).  Of course, a mark’s capacity for source identification is 
not immutable. As companies are bought and sold, as product information changes, and as products are 
altered, consumers’ understanding of brands will change based on one or a combination of these sorts of 
events.  Some commentators argue, based on this potential (or arguably inherent) instability, that the 
economic value of trademarks to the consumer has been seriously overstated.  See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 
32, at 730-32; see also Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment ‘with Goodwill’:  A Concept Whose Time Has 
Gone, 57 FLA. L. REV. 771, 830-31 (2005) (arguing that trademarks should be transferable “with or without 
goodwill,” in part because trademark owners have always had the ability to change the quality or nature of 
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The United States Supreme Court has also articulated this reasoning:  
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select 
what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark 
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the 
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. 
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same—to convey through the mark, 
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which 
it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark holder has something of value.35 
Not surprisingly, the law and economics presentation of trademarks accords with 
the valuation of brands in business discussed above. As stated by Warren Buffet, brands 
have the ability to generate tremendous value for a company because they are “intangible 
assets, particularly consisting of a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based 
on countless pleasant experiences that they have had with both product and personnel.”36 
This economic theory manifests itself via a typical trip to the grocery store.  For 
example, assume one enters the supermarket for the purpose of buying teriyaki sauce.  If 
the shopper has sampled or researched a particular brand of sauce before, he gains certain 
information about the brand, e.g., that Soy Vay® teriyaki sauce has the distinct taste of 
ginger.  Here, the trademark informs the buyer about the class of goods—teriyaki 
sauces—and tells the buyer that, when choosing among teriyaki sauces, he can pick 
specific ones with specific characteristics.  If he likes ginger, he may choose Soy Vay®; 
if he hates ginger, he may avoid it.  In either case, as the purveyor of the product educates 
the buyer about the product’s traits or the buyer performs some initial research, the buyer 
gains the benefit of being able to go to a store and buy the right sauce with the 
 
their products at will); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) (further 
critiquing the economic justification for trademark law). 
35 Misawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
36 Buffet, supra note 16, at 173; see also Calboli, supra note 34, at 799-814 (defining and discussing the 
concept of “goodwill” associated with a trademark). 
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characteristics she wants without having to check the label or perform new research each 
time she buys the sauce.   
Trademark infringement destroys a mark’s ability to reduce consumer search 
costs and is therefore inefficient, as well as potentially harmful to both the consumer and 
the trademark holder.  Infringement occurs when a competitor copies the relevant mark 
so that he can trick the consumer into buying his product, when the consumer was 
seeking out the trademark holder’s goods or services.  In other words, if a trademark is 
functioning properly as a source-identifier and the consumer has developed an affection 
for the product to which it is attached (i.e., the product has attained goodwill), 
competitors may be tempted to appropriate that goodwill by selling their own products 
under the same or a confusingly similar trademark.37 When this type of free-riding 
occurs, trademark law applies a likelihood of confusion analysis to determine whether the 
consumer will be deceived by the practice.38 Accordingly, though the mark holder 
enforces her rights against the free-rider, it is primarily the consumer who is protected.39 
Again, a trip to the supermarket illustrates the concept.  If I like Soy Vay® 
teriyaki sauce and I am “tricked” into buying a competitor’s inferior sauce because the 
competitor has placed a confusingly similar “Soy Vey” label on its bottle, both I and the 
maker of the “real” Soy Vay® have been injured via trademark infringement.  If the 
 
37 As Landes and  Posner state, “The benefits of trademarks in lowering search costs presuppose legal 
protection because the cost of duplicating someone else’s trademark is small and the incentive to incur this 
cost in the absence of legal impediments will be greater the stronger the trademark.”  LANDES & POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW, supra note 25, at 168; see also Klieger, supra note 4, at 
789; but see Lemley, supra note 9, at 1031-32 (noting that the property label for trademarks and the 
“rhetoric of free riding in intellectual property” “are misguided” as they allow for intellectual property right 
holders to “fully internalize the benefits of their creativity [which] will inevitably get the balance [between 
inventors’/ creators’ control and competition] wrong.”). 
38 See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. SleekCraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing factors considered 
by the courts in analyzing likelihood of confusion). 
39 Klieger, supra note 4, at 793-94. 
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competitor’s copying does not result in a “likelihood of confusion” on my part, however, 
there is no infringement and, absent dilution,40 no actionable injury.  
 
C. Limitations on the Scope of Protection Afforded to Trademarks  
Traditionally, trademarks—unlike their cousins patents and copyrights—have 
enjoyed only limited protection outside the likelihood of confusion context.  As explained 
above, in theory at least, uses of trademarks that do not infringe should not impinge on 
the mark’s ability to act as a source identifier and therefore are not inefficient.  Yet as 
trademarks (AKA brands) have become more and more valuable as corporate assets,41 
trademark holders have understandably pushed at the boundaries of trademark law and 
succeeded in expanding its scope, arguably reducing efficiency and hindering 
competition. 
In most contexts, intellectual property law aims to incentivize potential holders of 
intellectual property rights to develop intellectual property by giving “as little protection 
as possible consistent with encouraging innovation.”42 To that end, copyright and patent 
law grant limited monopolies to allow the rights holder to exploit the value of the 
 
40 Both the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) and state anti-dilution laws protect “famous” or highly 
distinctive marks against dilution, even in the absence of likelihood of confusion.   See notes 248-254 and 
accompanying text, infra.  The dilution doctrine has greatly expanded the scope of trademark protection, at 
least for the strongest marks, much to the dismay of many commentators.  See generally Klieger, supra 
note 4; but cf. Dilbary, supra note 25 (arguing that anti-dilution laws benefit both producers and consumers 
because “contamination” of a mark destroys its value to the consumer). 
41 See notes 20-30 and accompanying text, supra.
42 Lemley, supra note 9, at 1031; see also LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK 
LAW, supra note 25, at 8 (describing how property rights in physical items are aimed towards managing 
natural scarcity and price concerns, whereas intellectual property creates scarcity “which could not 
otherwise be maintained”) (citations omitted). 
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creation for a limited period of time.43 That system essentially and temporarily grants 
rights in gross—that is, the holder of the intellectual property has exclusive control over 
it and generates capital based on that control for a finite period of time.44 As to copyright 
and patent law, this notion is enshrined in the Constitution, which empowers Congress to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”45 In contrast, trademark law has no explicit Constitutional mandate but 
instead emerged from the common law tort of unfair competition.46 Also in contrast to 
copyrights and patents, trademarks do not expire after a set period of time, but instead 
endure so long as the mark holder continues to use the mark, potentially in perpetuity.47 
As a result, a fundamental tenet of trademark law has always been that, unlike copyrights 
and patents, trademarks are not held “in gross” and therefore the trademark holder’s right 
to prohibit others’ use of the mark is limited to circumstances in which that use harms 
consumers, as determined via the “likelihood of confusion” standard.48 
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Lemley, supra note 9, at 1042; cf. David W. Barnes, A New Economics 
of Trademarks (April 1, 2006) (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 886045; available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=886045) (arguing that the differences between copyrights and patents on the one 
hand and trademarks on the other are not as stark as is often presented, but rather that, like copyrights and 
patents, trademarks are public goods with non-rivalrous characteristics and must be understood as such “to 
supply an optimal amount of information about products and their sources”). 
44 LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW, supra note 25, at 8. 
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
46 LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK LAW, supra note 25, at 166. 
47 The Lanham Act provides that owner of a federally-registered trademark may maintain that registration 
by filing a renewal application (attesting to continued use) and paying a specified fee every ten years.  
There is no limit on the number of times the mark owner may renew his trademark registration.  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1058, 1059 (2005) (Lanham Act §§ 8, 9).     
48 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“In truth, a trade-mark confers 
no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of 
one’s good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol—a commercial signature—upon the 
merchandise or package in which it is sold.”); accord Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 
413-14 (1916). 
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As the rights of trademark holders have expanded, however, this fundamental 
tenet has eroded.  Put simply, trademark holders have relied upon a pure property 
conception of their rights to expand their dominion over those rights.49 This development 
poses serious problems because it strikes at the heart of the balance between intellectual 
property rights, competition, and expression that the law should respect and protect.  To 
understand what is at stake when we refer to “expression,” we now turn to an 
examination of the expressive capacity of trademarks.  
 
D. Trademarks’ Capacity for Expressive Use 
 
As explained above, trademarks are often considered and treated as corporate 
assets—often extremely valuable ones—that primarily serve to act as source identifiers 
for the goods or services to which they are attached.  However, in confronting the 
genericism conundrum, we must also take into account trademarks’ ability to function 
beyond this dimension.  Professor Barton Beebe contends that the law and economics 
approach “cannot explain, predict, or justify certain outcomes in [trademark] law, nor can 
it articulate the need for necessary reforms.”50 According to Beebe, this failing occurs in 
part because trademarks are “a semiotic doctrine elaborating the principles of sign 
systems, of language.  If there is a ‘language of commodities,’ then trademark doctrine is 
 
49 Many commentators have bemoaned this trend in trademark law.  See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 
406-410 (tracing the shift to a pure property approach to trademark rights and noting the way in which this 
shift limits the potential for expressive use of trademarks); Lemley, supra note 9, at 1032 (arguing that use 
of “[t]he rhetoric of real property, with its condemnation of ‘free riding’ by those who imitate or compete 
with intellectual property owners,” has resulted in “a legal regime for intellectual property. . .  in which 
courts seek out and punish virtually any use of an intellectual property right by another”); but see Robert G. 
Bone, Enforcement Cost and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099 (2004) (examining trademark law 
and criticisms of its expansion and arguing that the law’s apparent inconsistencies may best be understood 
as a way to address over- or under-enforcement of trademark rights and related costs). 
50 See Beebe, supra note 24, at 624 (arguing that law and economics cannot explain the “concepts of 
trademark ‘distinctiveness’ and trademark ‘dilution.’”). 
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its grammar, and this grammar must be understood not simply in economic, but also in 
linguistic terms.”51 
Although corporations construct trademarks either by inventing words or 
investing common words with commercial meaning, the public plays an important role in 
accepting those meanings and the public may—as it may with all language—manipulate 
terms and endow them with additional meaning.52 Judge Kozinski has explained the 
phenomenon as follows: 
[T]rademarks [may] transcend their identifying purpose.  Some trademarks enter 
our public discourse and become an integral part of our vocabulary. . . .  
Trademarks often fill in gaps in our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to 
our expressions. Once imbued with such expressive value, the trademark becomes 
a word in our language and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law.53 
Thus, we may find a trademarked word so pervasive and useful that we begin to use it in 
noncommercial contexts and indeed not as a trademark at all. We may incorporate a 
trademarked term into our everyday language, either through speech or writing, as a way 
to convey more than the trademark meaning of the term.54 In short, we may use a 
trademark “expressively.”  
 
51 Id. at 624. 
52 See generally id. (applying semiotic theory to trademark law to explain the way in which trademarks 
have both source distinctive and differential distinctive properties and the rise of the differential 
understanding as related to the commoditization of trademarks). 
53 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). 
54 In artistic contexts, expressive uses entail incorporating a trademark into a painting, sculpture, etc. These 
uses fall under a different yet related issue of the incorporation of a trademark into art and whether a given 
use is protected under First Amendment principles.  See, e.g.,Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (artistic works incorporating and transforming Mattel’s Barbie 
doll constituted parodic speech protected by the First Amendment). 
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Expressive uses of trademarks are pervasive in contemporary culture.  For 
example, we may ask for a Kleenex when we mean any facial tissue.  We may tell 
someone to “just put a Band-Aid on the problem” as a way of saying, “Use a quick fix.”55 
Moreover, the way in which the public uses words—including trademarks—is constantly 
changing.  “[N]ew words and expressions” may be viewed as “natural concomitants of 
social change that remain as long as people find them useful.”56 In other words, language 
is innovative and the public will adopt or drop words at will and as necessary.57 
Examples of the evolutionary nature of language abound.  When Xerox was the 
dominant if not the only maker of a copying machine, we might have “Xeroxed” a 
document instead of photocopying it.  In the 1980s and 1990s, the public may have 
primarily used the term “Walkman” to mean any portable audio cassette player; yet now 
that audio cassette players have been superseded by mp3 players, “Walkman” may be 
more commonly used to refer to the original Sony device.  Today, a person may say 
“iPod” to mean any mp3 player or to mean only the mp3 player sold by Apple, Inc.—all 
depending on who the speaker is and the context in which he uses the term.  
As the above examples demonstrate, trademarks function differently for different 
people in different contexts and are capable of different yet simultaneous uses.  The law 
and economics literature offers a way to describe this phenomenon. Professors Folsom 
and Teply characterize trademarks that behave in this manner as hybrid terms. Such terms 
“perform a variety of informational functions—ranging from the provision of pure 
 
55 Mattel, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900 (“How else do you say that something's ‘the Rolls Royce of its class’? What 
else is a quick fix, but a Band-Aid?”). 
56 Friedman, supra note 27, at  936; accord Shawn M. Clankie, Brand Name Use in Creative Writing: 
Genericide or Language Right?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A 
POSTMODERN WORLD 259 (Lide Buranen and Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) . 
57 Clankie, supra note 56, at 262 (“Language change and innovation are natural and, in general, 
unmanageable.”). 
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commercial or source-related information to the provision of pure generic or product-
category information—at the same time.”58 Based on this understanding Folsom and 
Teply identify “three types of consumers, each perceiving the significance of a hybrid 
trademarked generic word differently”:  
(1) those who are unaware of any source significance for the mark and who use 
the word as a product-category word, thereby facing added search or transaction 
costs;  
(2) those who are aware of the source and nonprice significance of the mark and 
who do not perceive, or use, the word as a product-category word; and  
(3) those who know that the mark has source significance, but who also use it in a 
product-category sense, and thereby may suffer increased search costs.59 
Folsom and Teply illustrate how the economic justification for trademarks based 
on their capacity to act as source identifiers is congruent with their concurrent capacity 
for expressive use.  At one end of the spectrum, users may afford a term no trademark 
significance because they interpret it as the name of a product category.  For these users, 
the term is generic and hence useless as a source identifier.  It is inefficient to treat truly 
generic terms as trademarks, because they do not act as source identifiers and hence 
would increase consumer search costs if given trademark protection.  At the opposite end 
of the spectrum are users who regard the term only as a trademark and for whom it 
always functions as a source identifier.  For these consumers the mark is optimally 
efficient; its protection as a trademark decreases consumer search costs.  In the middle 
are those who afford the term both trademark significance and non-trademark 
significance, complicating any attempt to analyze the impact on search costs and hence to 
determine the point at which trademark protection of the term becomes inefficient.  In 
 
58 Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1339. 
59 Id. at 1340.  
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this part of the spectrum people use a term as a trademark or expressively depending on 
the context. In truth, many if not the majority of “famous” trademarks fall into this 
middle spectrum. 
As discussed above, many brands function as both mega-valuable corporate assets 
and as invaluable expressive elements of language.60 At the core of this tension are the 
questions of whether trademarks are diminished by uses other than as trademarks or 
whether the law should force users to use terms in non-hybrid manners at the cost of 
losing the expressive dimension of the terms.61 Trademarks consist of words that 
symbolize a product and identify source, but once created, consumer upon consumer may 
use the trademark without the trademark holder having to produce anything new; in short 
trademarks, like ideas, need only be created once and as such seem to be nonrival goods 
with infinite capacity: 
An idea only needs to be created once to satisfy consumer demand while an apple 
must be produced for each consumer. Essentially, this means that the marginal 
costs of allowing an additional person to use an idea are zero. Most economists 
accept that it is efficient to maximize access to, and consequently consumption of, 
an existing nonrival good because generally there is only an upside; additional 
private benefits come at no additional cost. Ideas, like other nonrival goods, have 
infinite capacity.62 
60Accord Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 400-01 (noting the way in which Barbie can mean the doll itself and 
an image of a pretty but vapid woman); cf. LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRADEMARK 
LAW, supra note 25, at 168-69 (examining economics of language and noting, “The importance of 
trademarks to language is only modest, however, because the contribution they make to the language is 
mainly a byproduct of the contribution the products they designate make to the world of things.”). 
61 See generally Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005). 
62 Id. at 946; see generally Barnes, supra note 43 (noting that trademarks have been thought of as private 
goods but arguing that in fact trademarks function as public goods). Professor Frischmann explains that 
nonrivalry relates to infrastructure and argues that infrastructure resources are “are sharable in the sense 
that the resources can be accessed and used by multiple users at the same time” and notes, “Infrastructure 
resources vary in their capacity to accommodate multiple users, and this variance in capacity differentiates 
nonrival (infinite capacity) resources from partially (non)rival (finite but renewable capacity) resources.” 
Frishmann, supra note 61, at 942.  Although fully understanding whether trademarks function as 
infrastructure or more likely have infrastructure characteristics is beyond the scope of this article, it may be 
that trademarks’ hybrid nature makes them partially nonrivalrous which means that “one user's 
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Put differently, one could think of the purely nonrival characteristics of a trademark 
and consider that, when used as input for expression or commentary, the trademark 
generates a public good.63 The question becomes one of whether the expressive user 
would pay for the access to the good.64 The problem is that the expressive user is 
unlikely to pay for such a use, although society’s interest in having such a use is high.65 
We argue that this conflict culminates in the genericism doctrine because, as it operates 
today, the doctrine forces the trademark holder to protect her mark via means that 
threaten beneficial, expressive uses, if not squash them out of existence. 
As such we now turn to a historical perspective of genericism and genericide. This 
analysis seeks to unravel how the doctrine evolved and how its current application has 
strayed, such that it effectively serves neither the economic nor the expressive interests 
described above.  
 
II. The Genericism Conundrum 
 
A. The Trademark Name Game 
 
To understand the problem the genericism doctrine poses, the generic term must 
be understood in the context of the five basic classes into which a term may fall when 
 
consumption directly affects another user’s” but “can be managed in a way that avoids rivalrous 
consumption.” Id. at 951. 
63 See generally Barnes, supra note 43 (detailing the theoretical issues around public goods and market 
failures). 
64 See id. at  28 (explaining that “Marginal cost pricing fails to provide an allocatively efficient supply of 
public goods in a competitive marketplace”). 
65 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.L. REV. 944, 975 (2002) 
(detailing the problem in copyright context); accord Barnes, supra note 43 (citing Lunney and applying the 
insight to trademarks). 
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determining its trademark status:  arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, and 
generic.66 A term seeking to function as a trademark receives specific treatment as 
determined by the category to which it belongs.67 In general, terms that qualify on the 
arbitrary or fanciful end of the spectrum are considered to be the strongest marks meriting 
the broadest scope of protection; terms deemed generic receive no trademark protection; 
and suggestive or descriptive marks fall in the middle.68 Even though these 
classifications are critical in determining whether and to what degree a trademark will be 
protected against infringement, courts recognize that it is often exceedingly difficult to 
determine the appropriate label for a given term:  
These categories, like the tones in a spectrum, tend to blur at the edges and 
merge together.  The labels are more advisory and definitional, more like 
guidelines than pigeon holes.  Not surprisingly, they are somewhat 
difficult to articulate and apply.69 
At the top of the heap lie arbitrary and fanciful marks.  These types of marks are 
considered inherently distinctive and, therefore, may be registered as trademarks under 
the Lanham Act with no proof of acquired secondary meaning.70 Marks are considered 
 
66 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)).  
67 See Entrepreneur Media, Inc., 279 F.3d 1135, 141 (9th Cir. 2002). 
68 Id. (citing E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir.1992)); see also 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. 
69 Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 979 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 
F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Blinded Veterans Ass’n, 872 F.2d at 1039; Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove 
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing 
Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906 (D.R.I. 1980); rev’d, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981) (“One is tempted to compare 
the intellectual contortions involved in placing a word or symbol in its ‘proper’ category to the legendary 
scholastic pursuit of numbering the angels that can dance on the head of a pin.”); see also Bartow, supra 
note 32, at 738 and note 49 (criticizing: “Sorting marks into these malleable categories is performed as a 
matter of law, and judges generally accomplish this task by referencing their internal visceral impressions. 
This type of subjective contextualizing by courts deciding trademark disputes is seemingly required by 
extant legal doctrine and accustoms judges to using intuition, and to make instinctive rather than evidence 
driven legal determinations under the Lanham Act.”). 
70 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (noting that suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks are 
entitled to registration without proof of secondary meaning). 
- -25
“inherently distinctive” when “their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source 
of a product.”71 In other words, due to the nature of the mark, the law presumes that the 
mark is functioning as a source identifier.  Arbitrary and fanciful marks are also 
considered to be the strongest types of marks and, therefore, (somewhat 
counterintuitively) the most likely to be infringed.72 
Although arbitrary and fanciful marks are often grouped together, they actually 
describe two different types of trademarks.  Arbitrary marks adapt a common word to an 
uncommon setting, such as “apple” for computers or a record label.73 “The identical 
word can be generic or arbitrary depending on context; generic if it is the name of the 
good or service in common parlance (‘car’ as a textual mark for an automobile), and 
arbitrary if it has no logical association whatsoever with the underlying product (‘car’ as 
a textual mark for fabric softener).”74 Fanciful marks consist of invented words such as 
“Google,” “Kodak,” and “Xerox,” as opposed to common words used in an uncommon 
manner.75 “The term ‘fanciful,’ as a classifying concept, is usually applied to words 
invented solely for their use as trademarks. When the same legal consequences attach to a 
 
71 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. 
72 The court in Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003), explains that “[i]f a 
mark is arbitrary or fanciful, and makes no reference to the nature of the goods it designates, consumers 
who see the mark on different objects offered in the marketplace will be likely to assume, because of the 
arbitrariness of the choice of mark, that they all come from the same source.”  
73 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9 n. 6 (noting that the word “Ivory” may be generic as applied 
to elephant tusks but arbitrary as applied to soap).  Two users of the arbitrary mark “apple” have recently 
litigated the rights to this mark.  Apple Records first challenged Apple Computer’s use of “Apple” 25 years 
ago, settling the matter in 1991 with Apple computers agreeing not to offer music related products.  
Recently, Apple Records lost its attack on Apple Computer’s entry into the music business via its iTunes 
and iPod offerings.  Justice Mann declared Apple computer’s use of “Apple” in this context did not violate 
the parties’ earlier agreement. Apple Corps Limited v. Apple Computer Inc., [2006] EWHC 996 (CH), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/apple/aclaC50806opn.html.   
74 Bartow, supra note 32, at 742. 
75 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11. 
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common word, i.e., when it is applied in an unfamiliar way, the use is called 
‘arbitrary.’”76 
In the middle of the trademark class spectrum sit suggestive marks.  Like arbitrary 
and fanciful marks, suggestive marks are considered inherently distinctive and may be 
registered as trademarks with no proof of secondary meaning.77 However, unlike an 
arbitrary or fanciful mark, a suggestive mark is not a made-up word or a word used in an 
arbitrary context; it “suggests” the nature of the good or service to which it is attached. 78 
A suggestive mark differs from a descriptive mark in that it does not directly describe the 
attributes of the relevant good or service, but rather “requires imagination, thought and 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.”79 For example, the name 
“Coppertone” does not describe the color of a particular type of suntan lotion, but it does 
suggest the intended or hoped-for appearance of the consumer, after using the product.80.
Courts have reasoned that suggestive marks are entitled to greater protection than 
descriptive ones, because the competitor’s need to use the suggestive mark—unlike a 
descriptive term—is arguably minimal:  “The English language has a wealth of synonyms 
 
76 Id. 
77 Id.; see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769 (suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful marks are deemed inherently 
distinctive because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product). 
78 See, e..g, Tumblebus, Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding district court’s finding 
that “Tumblebus,” as applied to mobile gymnastics instruction for children, was suggestive); Peaceable 
Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Niles,” as applied to stuffed toy camel, found 
suggestive); Anhueser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 740 F.2d 631, 641 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court 
did not err in finding “LA” for low alcohol beer suggestive rather than descriptive); Citibank, N.A. v. 
Citibanc, Inc.,  724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Citibank” as applied to a bank found suggestive, but 
dissent argues that mark should be considered generic); Money Store v. Harriscorp Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d 
666 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding district court’s finding that “The Money Store,” as applied to money lending 
services, was suggestive); American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chemical Co., Inc. 589 F.2d 103, 106 
(2d Cir. 1978) (“Roach  Motel” as applied to insect trap found “at least” suggestive, if not arbitrary); 
Douglas Laboratories Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954) (“Copper Tone” for suntan 
lotion found suggestive rather than descriptive). 
79 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (citation omitted)). 
80 See Douglas Laboratories Corp., 210 F.2d 453 (“Copper Tone” for suntan lotion found suggestive rather 
than descriptive). 
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and related words with which to describe the qualities which manufacturers may wish to 
claim for their products and the ingenuity of the public relations profession supplies new 
words and slogans as they are needed.”81 
A descriptive mark, as the term implies, “conveys an immediate idea of the 
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods” or services to which it is attached.82 
For example, the name “Teddy Graham” describes a teddy bear-shaped graham cracker 
cookie; therefore, the mark could be considered descriptive of any graham cracker shaped 
like a teddy bear.  In that sense, descriptive terms travel close to being the general term 
for a product or service category (i.e., generic).83 The Lanham Act allows registration of 
“merely descriptive” terms such as “Teddy Graham” only when the term has acquired 
distinctiveness, or secondary meaning.84 The term “secondary meaning” is itself a bit of 
a misnomer.  A term is said to have acquired secondary meaning only when its primary 
meaning in the minds of the consuming public is that of a source identifier:  “[A]s a result 
of [the descriptive term’s] use, prospective purchasers have come to perceive [the term] 
as a designation that identifies goods [or] services” that are “produced or sponsored by a 
particular person.”85 In other words, if the consuming public takes the term “Teddy 
 
81 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 (citation omitted). 
82 Id. (internal citation omitted); see, e.g., In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(upholding T.T.A.B. finding that “patents.com,” as applied to software for tracking patent applications and 
issued patents, was descriptive); Security Center, Ltd. v. First National Security Centers, 750 F.2d 1295 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (upholding district court finding that “security center,” as applied to business housing private 
storage vaults, was descriptive rather than suggestive); Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 
698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding district court finding that “chick-fri” and “fish-fri,” as applied to 
coating for fried food, was descriptive rather than suggestive); Spex, Inc. v. The Joy of Spex, Inc., 31 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“spex” found descriptive). 
83 In re The Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
84 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (“[N]othing herein shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant 
which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.”) (Lanham Act § 2(f)). 
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 13(a),(b) (1995); see also Zatarain’s, Inc., 698 F.2d 
at 795 (mark has acquired secondary meaning if it denotes to the consumer “a single thing coming from a 
single source”) (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920)); see also Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. 11 (1982). 
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Graham” to mean a specific product emanating from a specific source—i.e., it is 
functioning as a source identifier—the term can be a trademark.  Absent proof of 
secondary meaning, a descriptive term cannot be protected as a trademark.86 
Regardless of the trademark category in which a term resides, all valid trademarks 
must function as source identifiers, with the attendant benefits in efficiency to the 
consumer explained above.  Descriptive and suggestive marks serve the additional 
function of conveying information to the consumer about the products to which they are 
attached.  From a marketer’s perspective, descriptive and suggestive terms are the most 
valuable types of marks, because they educate the consumer about the product, negating 
or at least reducing the need to do so through advertising.  Soy Vay®, for example, could 
be classified as a suggestive mark, as the name alludes to the inclusion of soy sauce in the 
product and the attendant taste.  If instead the sauce were called SHABAZZ or some 
other fanciful name, a consumer looking at the label would have no idea of what was in 
the sauce and/or how it tasted.  To discover the qualities of the product, the consumer 
would have to be informed and/or induced to experiment with the sauce by advertising.  
Thus, all trademarks are not created equal and, somewhat ironically, those marks that are 
the “strongest” in terms of their inherent distinctiveness (fanciful and arbitrary marks) are 
probably the least efficient in reducing consumer search costs.87 Nonetheless, these types 
of marks are entitled to the highest degree of protection under both common law and the 
Lanham Act. 
 
86 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (No mark may be registered which is “merely descriptive” of the applicant’s goods). 
87 See Carter, supra note 32, at 770-71.  Carter characterizes descriptive and suggestive marks as “cheaper 
information economizers” and, hence, more efficient.  Carter further points out that, even as to fanciful or 
arbitrary marks, some are more desirable than others, as evidenced by the amount of time and money 
companies invest in choosing their marks.  Id. 
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Generic words are unprotectable under the Lanham Act88 and the common law 
doctrine of unfair competition89 because they do not (or no longer) have the capacity for 
source identification.  The generic name is incapable of ever becoming a trademark, at 
least as to the product with which the generic name is associated.90 “If the primary 
significance of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the producer,
the trademark is a generic term . . . .”91 For example, if one calls one’s product “apple 
peeler” and the product is a device to peel apples, the term is generic and cannot be used 
as a trademark. Yet if one’s product is a computer or a record, “apple” is arbitrary and 
entitled to the highest trademark protection.  In contrast, as was the case with the word 
“aspirin,” a mark may begin as fanciful—a trademark class that receives the highest 
protection—and then drop to the lowest, unprotected class of terms, generic through the 
process of genericide.92 
88See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (“A petition to cancel a registration of a mark. . . may. . . be filed. . . (3) [a]t any 
time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for 
which it is registered. . . .  ”); 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’. . . [w]hen any 
course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to 
become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used. . . .  ”); 15 
U.S.C. § 1115 (b) (even “incontestable” marks are subject to the defense “that the mark has been 
abandoned.by the registrant”). 
89 See Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 7-8 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing cases); but 
see notes 127-133 and accompanying text. 
90 See notes 117 and 188, infra. 
91 Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in 
original; internal citations omitted).  See, e.g., Id.  (affirming summary judgment on grounds that “Filipino 
Yellow Pages,” as applied to phone directory marketed to Filipino-American community, was generic); 
Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court grant of 
preliminary injunction on grounds that “Shoe Warehouse” and “Warehouse Shoes,” as applied to store 
selling large inventory of shoes, was generic); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 
F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977) (reversing district court grant of preliminary injunction on grounds that “lite 
beer,” as applied to low-calorie beer, was generic); compare Anhueser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 
740 F.2d 631, 641 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court did not err in finding “LA” for low alcohol beer suggestive 
rather than descriptive); see also Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 
F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment on grounds that “yellow cab” was not generic 
as a matter of law); In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reversing 
T.T.A.B. finding that “1-888-M-A-T-R-E-S-S” was generic). 
92 See notes 136-150 and accompanying text, infra. 
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The twin goals of trademark law—economic efficiency and consumer protection—
are not served in the case of generic words and, therefore, they cannot become (or 
remain) trademarks.  When a word is or becomes generic, in theory that word is or has 
become the name of the good or service to which it is attached.  For example, if grocery 
shoppers called all teriyaki sauces “soy vays,” the name would no longer inform the 
consumer about the attributes of one specific sauce.  A word that is truly generic signals 
only that the good is a member of a particular product class.   
For the same reason, granting trademark rights in generic words does nothing to 
prevent the consumer from being deceived, in the grocery store or elsewhere.  If all 
teriyaki sauces are called soy vays, then so long as the label is placed upon a good in the 
proper product class, the consumer gets what he pays for when he buys a bottle of soy 
vay.  Therefore, the consumer receives no benefit from trademark protection of truly 
generic words.  Perhaps most importantly, generic words do not receive trademark 
protection because doing so would substantially harm the trademark holder’s competitors 
by preventing them from telling the public the name of the product or service they were 
attempting to sell.93 Thus, trademark protection does not apply to generic words or 
terms, because such protection would provide no benefit to the consumer and in fact 
would substantially harm the consumer by suppressing competition.  In addition, the 
public as a whole would suffer if truly generic words were allowed to become 
trademarks, because the public’s ability to use such words in everyday speech and print 
would potentially be abbreviated.  For all of these reasons, trademark protections do not 
apply to generic words. 
 
93 See Nguyen, supra note 7, at 744; see also Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1323. 
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B. Following the Path to Genericism:  The Evolution of a Doctrine 
For the reasons stated above, producers of goods or services typically do not 
choose obviously generic names as trademarks.  They have no incentive to do so, for (1) 
the name can and will be duplicated by competitors (with no legal redress); and (2) for 
that reason, it serves no source-identifying purpose.  However, many generic names did 
not start out that way.  They were created as protectable—often even arbitrary or 
fanciful—trademarks but evolved into generic words through the process of genericide.  
Many words that we use today in common speech have suffered this fate, including 
aspirin, brassiere, cola, escalator, lanolin, linoleum, Murphy bed, thermos, and yo-yo.94 
Moreover, the line between descriptive and generic words has proved to be an 
exceedingly difficult one to draw; therefore, the trademark holder may choose a brand 
name that she thinks is descriptive, only to learn later (much to her dismay and financial 
detriment) that the term is generic and hence unprotectable.95 The following section 
traces the origins of the genericism doctrine in trademark law and critiques the manner in 
which it has evolved. 
 
94 See Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, 874 F.2d 95 (2nd Cir. 1981) (Murphy bed); 
Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Manufacturing Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965) (yo-yo); King Seely 
Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2nd Cir. 1963) (thermos); Dixi-Cola Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941) (cola); Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 
U.S.P.Q. 80 (Comm’r Pat. 1950) (escalator); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y 1921) 
(aspirin); Charles R. DeBevoise Co. v. H&W. Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 114, 60 A.D. 407 (1905) (brassiere); Jaffe v. 
Evans & Sons, 70 A.D. 186, 75 N.Y.S. 257 (1902) (lanolin); Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch.D. 834 
(1878) (linoleum).   
95 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat); Retail Services, Inc., v. 
Freebies Publishing, 364 F.3d. 535 (4th Cir. 2004) (freebies); Natron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 
F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2002) (smart power); Miller Brewing Co., v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 
1981) (lite beer); CES Pub Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2nd Cir. 1975) (consumer 
electronics); Bascom Launder Corp. et. al. v. Telecoin Corp. et.al., 264 F. 2d 331 (2nd Cir. 1953) 
(launderette); Schwan’s IP, LLC v. Kraft Pizza Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Minn. 2005) (brick oven 
pizza); Loctite Corp. v. National Starch and Chemical Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (super 
glue). 
- -32
1. The Common Law Roots of Genericism and Genericide 
 
a. Common law distinctions between trademarks and trade-names 
 
At common law, only “technical trademarks”—what today would be classified as 
fanciful, arbitrary or suggestive marks—were protected against trademark infringement.96 
Similarly, only technical trademarks were registrable under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 
which was intended to codify, not alter, the common law of trademarks.97 The 1905 Act 
specified that personal names, geographic terms and terms that were “descriptive of the 
goods with which they are used, or of the character or quality of such goods” could not be 
registered.98 However, even though these “non-technical trademarks” were excluded 
from protection under trademark law, they were still entitled to protection—if the user 
could prove they had acquired secondary meaning—as “trade names” under the common 
law tort of passing off or unfair competition.99 In fact, even the 1905 Act allowed for 
 
96 See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (holding that “a generic name, or a name merely 
descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics, [cannot] be employed as a 
trade-mark and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection”); Lawrence Manuf’g Co. v. Tennessee 
Manuf’g Co., 138 U.S. 537, 547 (1891) (same). 
97 The Act specified that it did not “prevent, lessen, impeach, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which 
any party aggrieved by any wrongful use of any trade-mark might have had if . . .  this Act had not been 
passed.”  Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 23, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946).   
98Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch 592, § 5, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946).   
99 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Maine v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 45 F.2d 309, 310 (1st Cir. 1930) 
(because “Standard Oil” and “Standard Oil Company” had acquired secondary meaning, appellee was 
entitled to protection against “unfair or fraudulent use” of the name in competition); Computing Scale Co. 
v. Standard Computing Scale Co., 118 F. 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1902) (when a word “is incapable of becoming 
a valid trade-mark. . . yet has by use come to stand for a particular maker or vendor, its use by another in 
this secondary sense will be restrained as unfair and fraudulent competition. . . .”); American Waltham 
Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899) (even though “Waltham” was not a valid 
trademark, it had acquired secondary meaning and hence was entitled to protection from unfair 
competition); see generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (b) &  cmt. b (1938) (trade name has acquired 
“secondary meaning” when “a substantial number of present or prospective purchasers understand the 
designation, when used in connection with goods, services, or a business, not in its primary lexicographical 
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registration of marks that were “in actual and exclusive use as a trademark” for ten years 
preceding its date of enactment (February 20, 1905), even if such marks were descriptive 
or otherwise did not qualify as technical trademarks.100 This provision—often labeled the 
Ten-Year Law—has been described as “a codification of the secondary meaning 
theory.”101 
Common law trademarks were initially entitled to broader protection than were 
common law trade names.102 During the late nineteenth century, the courts recognized an 
exclusive property right in trademarks that created a virtual monopoly on the part of the 
trademark holder.103 As the United States Supreme Court reflected in The Trade-Mark 
Cases, “The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or 
 
sense, but as referring to a particular place or association”); HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 50 (3d ed. 1929) (“In the absence of secondary meaning, the law of 
unfair competition does not protect a name which is based on or is truly descriptive of the construction 
common to, or characteristics of an article.”).  
100Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch 592, § 5, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946); Thaddeus Davids Co. v. 
Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1914) (interpreting this section of the Act).    
101 NIMS, supra note 99, at § 43; see also id. at § 229a.  The now-ubiquitous trademark “Coca-Cola” is an 
example of a mark that was registered under the Ten-Year Law.  See Nashville Syrup Co. v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 215 F. 527, 530 (6th Cir. 1914). 
102See Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278-79 (C.C. Ind. 1900) (discussing differences between 
technical trademarks and trade names); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition:  A 
Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 316-17 (1979) (describing differences 
between technical trademarks and trade names in the context of late-nineteenth century “legal formalism”); 
Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis: Part I, 30 
COLUM. L. REV. 168, 168-70 (1930) (explaining the technical differences between trademarks and trade 
names); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 
(4th ed. 1924) (opining that trademark rights are “broader and by far . . . more valuable” than rights to a 
trade-name).  
103 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century:  The Development of the 
Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 343-44 (1980) (describing early treatment of 
trademarks as “absolute property”); McClure, supra  note 102, at 317-19 (characterizing early treatment of 
technical trademarks as conferring monopolistic property rights); Grafton Dulany Cushing, On Certain 
Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322 (1890) (noting that “[a] trademark has 
become an absolute right”); cf. HOPKINS, supra note 102, at § 24 (arguing that trademark rights are not 
“monopolistic” in character).   
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property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other 
persons, has been long recognized by the common law. . . .  It is a property right. . . .”104 
Trade names, on the other hand, were protected only when they had acquired 
secondary meaning, as discussed above, and only in cases of “fraud.”105 At its core, the 
common law “fraud” requirement, in cases of unfair competition or trade dress 
infringement, was and is essentially identical to the “likelihood of confusion” standard 
that now applies in trademark infringement cases as well.106 In other words, there is no 
trademark infringement and no “unfair” competition if the consumer is not likely to be 
confused by the alleged misuse of the trademark or the trade name.  Some earlier cases 
involving common law trade names also required that, to constitute “fraud” necessary to 
enjoin a competitor’s use of a trade name, the plaintiff  had to show that the defendant 
intended to pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff; in other words, that the defendant 
 
104 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (emphasis added); see also Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 
617, 619 (1879) (“The right to use the trade-mark is not limited to any place, city, or State, and, therefore, 
must be deemed to extend everywhere.”). 
105 See Cushing, supra note 103, at  332 (in “cases analogous to trade-marks,” i.e., cases involving common 
law trade names, “fraud is the gist of the action”); HOPKINS, supra note 102, at § 22 (“While fraud is 
presumed from the wrongful use of a trademark it must be proven, directly or by inference, in all cases of 
unfair competition which do not involve a technical trademark.”) (citing cases); see also id. at § 61 (use of 
“merely descriptive word” will not be restrained unless circumstances show “fraud on the part of the user”). 
106 See, e.g., Auto Body Specialists, Inc. v. Vallee, 500 A.2d 372, 375 (N.H. 1985) (in a case of common 
law infringement of a trade name, plaintiff’s right to injunctive relief depends on whether a “substantial 
likelihood of confusion resulted from defendant’s use”) (Souter, J.) (citations omitted); Boice v. Stevenson, 
187 P.2d 648, 653 (Ariz. 1947) (“The universal test [of unfair competition] is whether the public is likely to 
be deceived”) (citation omitted); J.C. Penney Co. v. Walker, 395 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. App. 1965) (Wilson, 
J., concurring) (noting that, even if a descriptive name has acquired secondary meaning, “if there is not 
shown confusion of the public or tendency to deception,” there is no unfair competition); Sartor v. Schaden, 
101 N.W. 511, 513 (Iowa 1904) (even if a word is not “capable of becoming an arbitrary trade-mark,” if it 
has acquired secondary meaning its use will be restrained if “confusion [of the public] has been or is likely 
to be produced”); Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 10, 16 (Cal. App. 1959) (whether trade 
dress has been infringed depends in part on “whether the public is likely to be deceived”) (citation omitted); 
New York World’s Fair v. World’s Fair News, 256 A.D. 373, 374 (N.Y. App. 1939) (“The determining 
factor is not that people have actually been deceived but that there is a likelihood of that happening.”) 
(citation omitted); see also Handler & Pickett,  supra note 102, at 169 (competitor’s use of a trade names 
will be restrained only when such use “render[s] it likely that the public will confuse the products bearing 
the marks”). 
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had an intent to confuse.107 This requirement, however, was applied inconsistently, with 
most courts eventually adopting what the Supreme Court of Georgia characterized as the 
“better view” that “an actual fraudulent intent need not be shown if the necessary and 
probable tendency of defendant’s conduct is to deceive the public and to pass off his 
goods or business as that of the plaintiff. . . .”108 
As the monopolistic approach to trademarks gave way to the now-familiar maxim 
that trademarks are not held “in gross,” courts imposed limitations on trademark rights 
that were identical to those already in place for cases involving trade names.109 
Therefore, the supposed distinction between common law trademarks and trade-names 
became more formalistic than real, and courts began to treat the two classes of common 
 
107 See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co., 395 S.W.2d at 79 (Wilson, J., concurring) (action for “deceptive simulation” 
of “generic words” that have acquired secondary meaning requires a finding that “such simulation was 
calculated to deceive ordinarily prudent persons”); Belleville News-Democrat, Inc. v. St. Clair County 
Publishers, Inc., 167 N.E. 2d 573, 575 (Ill. App. 1960) (use of generic or descriptive word that has acquired 
secondary meaning may be enjoined when its use by another “is palpably intended to deceive”); New York 
World’s Fair, 256 A.D. at 375 (when “the appropriation and continued use of the name of another. . . are 
conceived in bad faith and with an intent to deceive the public, equity will afford complete and adequate 
relief. . . .”); Drive It Yourself Co. v. North, 130 A. 57, 59 (Md. App. 1925) (use of “merely generic or 
descriptive” words may be enjoined only if there is “actual fraud or intent to deceive”); McClure, supra  
note 102, at 317 (in an unfair competition claim plaintiff “was required to prove . . . fraudulent intent by the 
defendant”). 
108 Saunders System Atlanta Co., Inc. v. Drive It Yourself Co. of Georgia, 123 S.E. 132, 136 (Ga. 1924); 
see also McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 117 F.2d 293, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1940) 
(“Unfair competition in the trade name field is not concerned with intent or plan; it is enough if the acts of 
the defendant in light of plaintiff’s reputation result in an unfair benefit to the former”).  According to the 
Restatement of Torts, “fraud”—in terms of the defendant’s actual (not implied) intent to deceive the 
public—was a required element of trade-name infringement under the common law only when plaintiff’s 
trade-name had not acquired secondary meaning:  “[t]he notion that fraud is necessary for trade name 
infringement is largely due to the loose denomination of such a name as a trade name.”  RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS, supra note 99, at § 717 cmt. a; see also First Wisconsin Nt’l Bank v. Wichman, 270 N.W.2d 168, 
173 (Wis. 1978) (same); see generally E.H. Schloper, Annotation, Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the 
Law of Trademark and of Unfair Competition, 150 A.L.R. 1067, 1133 (1944) (noting split of authorities as 
to whether “it is necessary for the plaintiff to show actual fraud on the part of the defendant” in cases where 
plaintiff’s rights in a trade-name are predicated on secondary meaning).   
109 See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (“Common-law trademarks, 
and the right to their exclusive use, are, of course, to be classed among property rights, but only in the sense 
that a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good will that flows from it, 
free from unwarranted interference by others, is a property right, for the protection of which a trademark is 
an instrumentality.  [T]he right grows out of use, not mere adoption.”) (emphasis added and internal 
citation omitted); see also Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278 (C.C. Ind. 1900) (“The tendency 
of the courts at the present time seems to be to restrict the scope of the law applicable to technical trade-
marks, and to extend its scope in cases of unfair competition.”) (citations omitted).  
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law marks essentially the same.110 The Supreme Court recognized and articulated this 
development in 1916:   
Courts afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a valuable 
interest in the good-will of his trade or business. . . .  The essence of the 
wrong consists of the sale of the goods of one manufacturer for those of 
another.  This essential element is the same in trade-mark cases as in 
cases of unfair competition unaccompanied by trademark infringement.  In 
fact, the common law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of 
unfair competition.111 
Despite this similarity of treatment under the common law, a trade name (unlike a 
common law trademark) could not be registered under the Trademark Act of 1905 if it 
did not meet the requirements of the Ten-Year Rule.112 This discrepancy was not 
particularly important, as the benefits of federal registration were limited.    
The rights of registered trademark holders expanded greatly when the Lanham 
Act was passed in 1946.  First, the Act expanded the types of marks that were eligible for 
protection under the federal law by allowing registration of even “merely descriptive 
marks,” so long as they have become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods in 
commerce.”113 A “common descriptive” name of an article (i.e., a generic name), 
however, could not be registered under any circumstances.114 Therefore, since 1946, a 
descriptive mark that has acquired secondary meaning (but not a generic one) may be 
 
110 See Handler & Pickett,  supra note 102 (arguing that trademarks and trade names are essentially treated 
the same under common law); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 99, at § 717 cmt. a (stating that “there 
are no important differences between the protection given to the interest in trade-marks and that given to 
the interest in trade names”).   
111 Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis added). 
112 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch 592, § 5, 33 Stat 724 (1905) (repealed 1946); Thaddeus Davids Co. v. 
Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1914) (interpreting this section of the Act); Barber-Colman Co. v. Overhead 
Door Corp., 65 F.2d 147, 150 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (holding that mark which has acquired secondary meaning, 
but is not a technical trademark, cannot be registered under Trade-Mark Act of 1905 unless 10-year rule 
applies); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1940) (arguing that, 
because trade names and trademarks are essentially treated the same under the common law, both should be 
protected and registrable under the Federal Trademark Act).   
113Lanham Act, ch 540, § 2(e) & (f), 60 Stat 427, 429 (1946) (amended 1988). 
114 Lanham Act, ch 540, § 15(4), 60 Stat 427, 434 (1946) (amended 1988). 
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protected from infringement under the Lanham Act as well as the state common law of 
unfair competition.  Second, unlike previous iterations of the federal trademark statute, 
the 1946 Lanham Act expanded the rights of registered trademark holders beyond those 
attainable under common law.  At common law, trademark (and trade name) rights were 
limited to the mark holder’s geographic area of use—in other words, the first user of the 
mark could claim priority only in those geographic areas in which his mark had acquired 
“goodwill.”115 Under the 1946 Lanham Act, however, the holder of a registered mark 
acquired nationwide priority against any “junior” user of the mark, even if the junior user 
was the first to acquire goodwill in a given geographic area.116 
b. Common law treatment of generic or “common descriptive” terms 
as trade-names 
 
In contrast to the 1946 Lanham Act, the common law treated neither “descriptive” 
nor “generic” terms as “technical trademarks,” and therefore they could not be protected 
against trademark infringement.  However, this discrepancy in terminology made little 
practical difference, at least with regard to terms that had acquired secondary meaning. 
As explained above, such terms were protected from infringement under the common law 
doctrine of unfair competition.   
Modern caselaw generally takes as a given the notion that, unlike descriptive 
terms, “generic” words or terms are and have always been unprotectable under the 
 
115 Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 414; United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-
98 (1918). 
116 Lanham Act, ch 540, § 2(d), 60 Stat 427, 428 (1946) (amended 1988). 
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common law, even if such words have acquired  secondary meaning.117 Although courts 
have consistently held that “generic” or “common descriptive” terms cannot be registered 
as trademarks under the Lanham Act,118 a closer examination of the common law of 
unfair competition reveals that these cases did not attempt to draw a bright line between 
generic and descriptive terms.119 In other words, common law courts—unlike modern 
ones—did not devote a great deal of attention to determining whether a given term should 
be etymologically classified as generic or descriptive.  Both “words descriptive of 
qualities or attributes” and “generic designations” were potentially protectable as trade 
 
117 See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1045 n. 22 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“generic term that acquires de facto secondary meaning is still not afforded trademark 
protection”); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 924 (10th Cir. 1986) (“Trademarks 
that have become generic are subject to cancellation even if they have acquired a secondary meaning.”);  
Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(generic term “cannot become a trademark under any circumstances”);  Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman 
Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[E]ven proof of secondary meaning. . . cannot transform a 
generic term into a subject for trademark.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 
9 (2d Cir. 1976) (same); CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 
1975)  (“merely descriptive” terms can be “rescued as trademarks” via proof of secondary meaning, but 
generic terms cannot); see generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, §§ 12:1, 12:47 (generic name “can 
never function as a trademark to indicate origin”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15 
cmt. a (1995) (“Generic designations are not subject to appropriation as trademarks at common law. . . .”); 
3 LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMAN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 20:33 n. 49 & 
50 (West 2004) (citing cases). 
118 See, e.g., J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx and Co., 280 F.2d 437,  440 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“common 
descriptive name” of an article cannot be registered as a trademark, despite evidence of secondary 
meaning); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel and Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 846 (C.C.P.A. 1961) 
(canceling registration of the mark Ha-Lush-Ka on the grounds that it was the “common descriptive name 
for egg noodles”); In Re Space-General Corp., 136 U.S.P.Q. 77, 78 (T.T.A.B. 1962) (refusing registration 
of Space Electronics for navigational guidance equipment on grounds that it was a “common descriptive 
name”); In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 772, 776 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (refusing registration of “Softsoap” 
for liquid soap on grounds that “proof of secondary meaning cannot transform a generic term into a subject 
for trademark registration”); but cf. In re Minnetonka, Inc., 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1711, 1713 (T.T.A.B. 1987) 
(finding that “Softsoap” is not generic, based on additional evidence submitted in support of trademark 
application). 
119 See, e.g., Speaker v. Shaler Co., 87 F.2d 985, 987 (7th Cir. 1937) (noting that “descriptive words” are 
“included within the broader category of generic terms”); HOPKINS, supra note 102, at § 46 (defining a 
“generic term” as any term that is “too general in its meaning to become the monopoly of an individual in 
application to merchandise,” including geographical names, proper names, and descriptive words). 
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names (but not as technical trademarks), if they functioned as source identifiers in the 
marketplace (if, in other words, they had acquired secondary meaning).120 
Although McCarthy characterizes this view as an “aberrant” one adopted by only 
a minority of courts,121 numerous state and federal courts have held – particularly during 
the pre-Lanham Act era – that so-called “generic terms” are entitled to protection from 
“passing off” or infringement, if they have acquired secondary meaning.  In fact, the 
common law precedents of most states held that the secondary meaning doctrine applied 
to words both “generic” and descriptive in character.122 Likewise, many federal courts 
have also held that “purely generic or descriptive” words are entitled to protection from 
 
120 Handler & Pickett,  supra note 102, at 169; see also McClure, supra  note 102, at 316 (same); HOPKINS,
supra note 102, at § 49 (noting that “[t]he protection of equity is extended under proper circumstances to 
generic words as readily as to technical trademarks”); see generally Schloper, supra note 108, at 1095 
(stating that “words, or combinations of words, may, by acquiring secondary meaning, become entitled to 
protection . . . though in their primary sense they are . . . generic or descriptive”).  
121 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:46. 
122 See, e.g., Bell v. Davidson, 597 P.2d 753, 755 (Ok. 1979) (generic or descriptive names may be 
protected against unfair competition if they have acquired secondary meaning); Staple Cotton Cooperative 
Ass’n v. Federal Staple Cotton Co-op Ass’n, 162 So.2d 867, 869 (Miss. 1964) (same); Storm v. Canyon 
Amusement Corp., 79 N.W. 2d 698, 700 (S.D. 1956) (same); Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden 
Slipper Rest. & Catering, 88 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1952) (same); Farrell v. Mennen Co., 235 P.2d 128, 130 (Utah 
1951) (same); Bernstein v. Friedman, 160 P.2d 227, 229 (Wyo. 1945) (same); Houston v. Berde, 2 N.W.2d 
9, 10 (Minn. 1942) (when “generic words are used in a trade-name,” their use will be restrained when such 
use causes confusion or deception); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 104 P.2d 650, 
652 (Cal. 1940) (deceptive use of “generic, descriptive, personal, and geographic names” that have 
acquired secondary meaning constitutes unfair competition); Jenney Mfg. Co. v. Leader Filling Stations 
Corp., 196 N.E. 852, 855 (Mass. 1935); Electric Supply Co. v. Hess, 245 P. 27, 28 (Wash. 1926) 
(secondary meaning doctrine applies to “common, descriptive [and] generic words”); Saunders System 
Atlanta Co., Inc. v. Drive It Yourself Co. of Georgia, 123 S.E. 132, 136 (Ga. 1924) (same); American 
Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899) (plaintiff can exclude defendant 
from “the mere use of generic words, unqualified and unexplained, when they would mislead plaintiff’s 
customers to another shop”); MacPhail v. Stevens, 586 P.2d 1339 (Colo. App. 1978) (generic and 
descriptive terms are not entitled to trademark protection without a showing of secondary meaning); Anti-
Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 543-44 (1972) 
(either “generic or descriptive” tradenames may be entitled to protection upon showing of secondary 
meaning); Williamson v. Answer Phone of Jacksonville, Inc., 118 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. App. 1960) (same); 
Better Business Bureau of Kansas City Adv. Club, Inc. v. D. J. Chappell, 307 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. App. 
1957) (same); Moskins Stores, Inc. v. Columbus Bentley Mercantile Co., 22 Ohio Law Abs. 488, 1936 WL 
4309 at *1 (Oh. App. 1936) (same; quoting Corpus Juris); Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 104 
N.E. 34, 38 (Ind. App. 1914) (same). 
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unfair competition, provided that they have acquired secondary meaning.123 Although 
the reasoning of these cases (particularly the federal ones) has largely been repudiated,124 
some states still adhere to this doctrine.  For example, in 1985 Justice Souter (while 
sitting on the New Hampshire Supreme Court) wrote that “words or phrases may enter 
commerce as merely generic or descriptive, but commercial usage can invest them with a 
secondary meaning associating them with a given business, so as to entitle that business 
to protect the association.”125 Oregon also recognizes that “generic names” may acquire 
“a legally protectible secondary meaning” under the common law.126 As recently as 
1998, a Pennsylvania court held that even though a “generic term” is never granted 
trademark protection, “an action for unfair competition on the basis of likelihood of 
 
123 Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 659-60 (Cir. Ct. Del. 1899); see also Murphy Door 
Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing state law 
doctrine by which “a generic term already in public use later acquires secondary meaning . . . thus 
warranting trademark protection”); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374-75 (1st Cir. 
1980) (although “at common law terms that are generic are normally not subject to appropriation as 
trademarks, . . . a strong showing of secondary meaning may be sufficient to grant a right to exclusive 
use”); American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248, 1251 & 1253 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(noting that “in the absence of a strong showing of secondary meaning, a generic name cannot be the basis 
of a trademark”); Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1935) 
(generic word may acquire secondary meaning); G.W. Cole Co. v. American Cement & Oil Co., 130 F. 
703, 705 (7th Cir. 1904) (“unfair use” of even a “purely generic or descriptive word” may be enjoined as 
unfair competition); Dadirrian v. Yacubian, 98 F. 872, 879-80 (1st Cir. 1900) (“secondary use of a generic 
term” may be protected if such use may confuse the public); Bliss Cleaning Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest Brake 
Bond Co., 339 F. Supp. 2d 944, 965 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (“Generic and descriptive marks. . . are not entitled 
to trademark protection unless they have acquired secondary meaning”); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 
v. Nationwide Independent Directory Service, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 908 (W.D. Ark. 1974) (same); 
American Products Co. v. American Products Co., 42 F.2d 488, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1930) (words which are 
“purely generic or descriptive” are not arbitrary trade-marks, but still may be protected from unfair 
competition); Dry Ice Corp. of America v. Louisiana Dry Ice Corp., 46 F.2d 526, 531 (W.D. La. 1930) 
(secondary meaning doctrine may apply to descriptive words or “names of a generic class”), rev’d on other 
grounds, 54 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1932).  
124 See note 117, supra.
125 Auto Body Specialists, Inc. v. Vallee, 500 A.2d 372, 374 (N.H. 1985) (finding “auto body specialists” to 
be a protectable trade name) (emphasis added).  In Vallee, Justice Souter characterized the “view that 
generic (or even some descriptive) terms are inherently incapable of ever becoming secondary meaning 
marks” as “ill-considered.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
126Classic Instruments, Inc. v. VDO-Argo Instruments, Inc., 700 P.2d 677, 687 (Or. App. 1985) (citation 
omitted); see also Liquidators v. Clifton, 286 P. 152, 153 (Or. 1930); Umpqua Broccoli Exchange v. 
Umqua Valley Broccoli Growers, 245 P. 324, 327 (Or. 1926).   
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confusion may still lie.”127 Of course, most “generic” names (e.g., apple peeler, beer, 
cookies) are unlikely, by their very nature, to acquire secondary meaning, and therefore 
were unlikely to acquire protection under the common law.128 However, most common 
law cases did not hold that “generic” names were inherently incapable of acquiring 
secondary meaning. 
Modern courts refuse to extend trademark protection to generic words or terms 
because they are concerned that doing so would negatively impact competition:  “[N]o 
matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting 
the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public 
identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to 
call an article by its name.”129 The early common law courts shared this same concern, 
and for this reason they were unwilling to extend trademark rights—which were, at least 
initially, significantly more monopolistic in character than rights in a trade name130—to 
generic or descriptive words or terms.  In 1871 the United States Supreme Court held that 
neither a “generic name, [nor] a name merely descriptive of an article of trade. . . [may] 
be employed as a trade-mark and the exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection.”131 
However, as noted above, the courts’ refusal to extend trademark rights to such 
words did not preclude their protection as trade names under the common law doctrine of 
unfair competition.  The courts attempted to protect competition in such cases via what 
today would be characterized as “classic fair use”—the principle that a trademark holder 
 
127 Pennsylvania State Univ. v. University Orthopedics, Ltd., 706 A.2d 863, 871 (Pa. Super. 1998). 
128 See, e.g., Bourne, 385 P.2d at 736 (noting that when a trade name is “primarily composed of generic or 
descriptive words” instead of words that “have some distinctive or identifying character of their own,” it is 
“much more difficult to prove a secondary meaning”).  
129 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
130 See notes 102-104 and accompanying text, supra. 
131 Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (emphasis added). 
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cannot “prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of their goods.” 132 
Therefore, even if a generic or descriptive term had acquired secondary meaning and 
hence was protectible as a “trade name,” a competitor could use that term to describe his 
own goods, so long as the goods were marked in a manner that would “clearly [denote] 
the origin, manufacture or ownership of such articles,” and/or negate “any idea that they 
were produced or sold” by the trade name holder.133 Therefore, a competitor was not 
deprived of “the right to call an article by its name”134; he could do so, so long as his use 
of the name did not “mislead the public and divert business from his competitor to 
himself.”135 
2. Death by Patent—the Emergence of the Primary Significance Test 
 
As explained above, under the common law of unfair competition, the courts did 
not place a great deal of emphasis on the etymological distinction between generic and 
descriptive terms, and therefore few cases attempted to demarcate a finite border between 
the two.  However, the courts did hold that some words or terms—even those that were 
 
132 New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub. Co., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (party’s use of a trademark “which is descriptive of and used fairly and in 
good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party” is not actionable); Cairns v. Franklin Mint 
Co., 292 F.2d 1139, 1150-52 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining the difference between “classic” and “nominative’ 
fair use).  
133 Dennison Mf’g Co. v. Thomas Mf’g Co., 94 F. 651, 659-60 (Cir. Ct. D. Del. 1899); see also Guastavino 
Co. v. Comerma, 180 F. 920, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); G .& C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th 
Cir. 1912) (if descriptive words have acquired secondary meaning, defendant “is required to accompany his 
use of the bare word with sufficient distinguishing marks. . .  to prevent the otherwise normally resulting 
fraud”); Hansen v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 106 F. 691, 692 (Cir. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1900); American Waltham 
Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 173 Mass. 85, 87, 53 N.E. 141, 142 (1899) (“mere use of generic 
words, unqualified and unexplained,” may be enjoined when such use would mislead consumers) 
(emphasis added); Skinner v. Martin, 109 U.S.P.Q. 156, 158 (Cal. App. Super. 1956) (when trade name 
protection is extended to words which are also “generic,” restriction of use “will be considerably more 
limited. . . because the words tell the truth generally, and only in special uses are deceptive”). 
134 See note 129, supra. 
135 OK Bus & Baggage Co. v. OK Transfer & Storage Co., 165 P. 136, 140 (Ok. 1917). 
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arbitrary or fanciful and presumed to be distinctive—did not act as source identifiers and 
hence could not be trademarks or trade names.  The courts recognized the evolutionary 
nature of language, such that even “technical” trademarks could lose their ability to act as 
source identifiers and hence lose their entitlement to protection from infringement.  This 
phenomenon, which we now refer to as genericide, was much more likely to occur when 
the mark was placed on a product that was or had been the subject of a utility patent.136 
Trademark holders who obtain patents on the goods to which their trademarks are 
attached may fall victim to their own success.  Because the trademark/patent holder 
enjoys a monopoly over the production of the good during the patent period, the 
trademark label placed on the good typically serves a dual function:  to identify the sole 
source of the good (i.e., the trademark holder) and to identify the good itself.137 When 
the patent period ends, consumers continue to identify the good by using the trademark.  
Therefore, when new producers come into the marketplace, they suffer a serious 
competitive disadvantage if they cannot use the trademark to identify the good.  After all, 
the consuming public understands nothing else, regardless of whether the term would 
otherwise be characterized as arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, or descriptive.  The Supreme 
Court has described the “death by patent” process as follows:   
 
136 See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat); Singer Mfg. Co. 
v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (Singer); Nupla Corp., v. IXL Mfg. Co., Inc, 114 F.3d 191 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (Cush-N-Grip); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Manufacturing Co., 343 F.2d 655 
(7th Cir. 1965) (yo-yo); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) 
(cellophane); Micro Motion, Inc. v. Dan Floss A/S. 49 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1628, 1629 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (Massflo); 
Birtcher Electro Medical Systems, Inc. v. Beacon Laboratories, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 417 (D.Colo. 1990) 
(Argon Beam Coagulator); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (aspirin); Haughton 
Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80, 81 (Comm'r. Pat. 1950) (escalator); Charles R. De Bevoise Co. 
v. H.& W. Co., 60 A. 407 (N.J. Eq. 1905) (brassiere); Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch. D. 834 (1878) 
(linoleum). 
137 See Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118; Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 186-87; Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. 
Blinded American Veterans Foundation, 872 F.2d 1035, 1044 n. 21 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  
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It . . . follows from the cessation of the [patent] monopoly and the falling 
of the patented device into the domain of all things public that along with 
the public ownership of the device there must also necessarily pass to the 
public the generic designation of the thing which has arisen during the 
monopoly.  [T]he designated name. . . [is] . . . necessary to vest the public 
with the full enjoyment of that which ha[s] become theirs by the 
disappearance of the monopoly.138 
Consider, for example, the terms “aspirin” and “shredded wheat.”139 In both 
cases the manufacturer had a patent on the product.  It marketed the product solely under 
a mark of its choosing but did not offer the public or a potential future competitor an 
alternative term with which to refer to the product.140 The contemporaneous use of the 
patent and trademark created a situation in which competitors and courts could credibly 
claim that the term in question was the general name of the product and not a source 
identifier and, therefore, unprotectable.   
 Judge Learned Hand eloquently described the genericide process in Bayer Co. v. 
United Drug Co.,141 a case involving the genericide of a name that was initially fanciful 
(“aspirin”)142 but became generic.  In this case, Judge Hand found that consumers (not 
surprisingly) did not recognize “monoaceticacidester of salicylicacid” or “acetyl salicylic 
acid” as the name of their favorite headache remedy: 
The single question, as I view it, in all these cases, is merely one of fact:  What do 
the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?  If 
 
138 Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118 (citing Singer Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. at 185).  Although this language from 
the Supreme Court’s opinions in Kellogg and Singer could be interpreted to suggest that a trademark 
applied to a patented product necessarily becomes generic upon expiration of the patent, courts have almost 
uniformly held to the contrary:  whether a trademark becomes generic upon expiration of the underlying 
patent is a question of fact.  President Suspender Co. v. MacWilliam, 238 F. 159, 163 (2d. Cir. 1916) 
(citation omitted); see generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:52. 
139 Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. 111 (shredded wheat); Bayer Co., 272 F. 505 (aspirin). 
140 Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 117; Bayer Co., 272 F. at 510-11 (finding that the consumer had “never heard 
the name ‘acetylsalicylic acid’ as applied to [the drug], and without some education could not possibly have 
kept it in his mind, if he had”); compare Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that “[s]ometimes a trademark owner will sponsor a generic term precisely in order to avoid its 
mark becoming generic”).   
141 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
142 Id. at 509 (describing “aspirin” as a “coined” word that “means nothing by itself”). 
- -45
they understand by it only the kind of goods sold, then, I take it, it makes no 
difference whatever what efforts the plaintiff has made to get them to understand 
more.  He has failed . . . .143 
Judge Hand concluded that the word “aspirin” was no longer a valid trademark for 
consumers because it had lost all of its ability to function as a source identifier for the 
consumer.144 
The record was not quite so clear when Justice Brandeis wrote his seminal 
opinion of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.145 This case addressed the question of 
whether the term “Shredded Wheat” was “generic” and hence unprotectable as a common 
law trade name.146 The process for making the product in question, shredded wheat, had 
been patented and, during that period of exclusive use, only the term “shredded wheat” 
had been applied to the product.147 After that patent expired, the question arose as to 
whether the term “shredded wheat” was available to all makers of “pillow-shaped wheat 
biscuits” or whether the successor in interest to the goodwill of the patent holder should 
have the exclusive use of the term.148 This case is frequently cited as the source of the 
 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 510 (finding that consumers “did not understand by the word [aspirin] anything more than a kind 
of drug”).  Judge Hand reached the opposite conclusion with regard to the “manufacturing chemists, retail 
druggists, and physicians” who purchased the drug directly from Bayer.  Id. at 513.  He found that this class 
of purchasers understood “Aspirin” to mean “the plaintiff's manufacture,” and further that they “ha[d] 
recourse to another and an intelligible name for it [acetyl salicylic acid], actually in use among them.”  Id. 
As to this group of consumers, Hand concluded that “Aspirin” was still a valid and protectable trademark.  
Id. at 513-14. 
145 305 U.S. 111 (1938).  For an excellent investigation regarding the history and importance of Kellogg, 
see Graeme Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
146 The Court recognized that common law governed whether the mark “Shredded Wheat” was protectable.  
Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 113. 
147 Id. at 118. 
148 Id. at 111-12. 
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“primary significance” doctrine, which has become the touchstone for genericism 
analysis today, both in case law149 and in the Lanham Act itself.150 
Applying the terminology of Folsom and Teply, Justice Brandeis essentially 
found that “Shredded Wheat” was a hybrid trademark151: some consumers perceived it as 
a source identifier, but others perceived it as the generic name of the article.  Brandeis 
recognized that “many people have come to associate the product, and as a consequence 
the name by which the product is generally known, with the plaintiff’s factory at Niagara 
Falls.”152 However, he determined that this understanding of the term as a source 
identifier was only its “subordinate meaning.”153 Because the Court found that the 
generic understanding of “Shredded Wheat” was the predominant or “primary 
significance” of the term, it held that “Shredded Wheat” was not a protectable trade 
name.154 
Justice Brandeis’ opinion can and should be interpreted in the context of the 
common law as it was understood when the opinion was written.  As noted above, during 
this period courts did not often attempt to delineate between “generic” and descriptive 
terms (and may have used these monikers interchangeably); in either case, their focus 
was rather on whether the word(s) in question had acquired “secondary meaning.”  In 
language strikingly similar to that employed by Justice Brandeis, the Restatement of 
 
149 See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 823 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying  “primary 
significance” test in finding “instant message” generic); Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 
1996) (mark is generic if its “primary significance. . . to the relevant public is to identify the class of 
product or service”); Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3rd Cir. 1993) ( “the primary 
significance test must be utilized to determine a term’s genericness”). 
150 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (“The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather 
than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the 
generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”) 
151 See notes 58-59 and accompanying text, supra.
152 305 U.S. at 118. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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Torts (published in 1938, the same year as Shredded Wheat), explained that “secondary 
meaning” does not refer to “a subordinate or rare significance.  It means rather a 
subsequent significance added to the previous meaning of the designation and becoming 
in the market its usual and primary significance.”155 
Considered in this context, Justice Brandeis’ reasoning in Shredded Wheat can at 
least arguably best be understood as a clarification of the common law secondary 
meaning doctrine—a holding that the doctrine applies only when the source-identifying 
function of the alleged trade name has become its “primary significance” in the mind of 
the consumer.  Conversely, at least when dealing with a descriptive word or term, if the 
“primary” significance is not that of a source identifier, it cannot be protected as a 
common law trade name.  Viewed in this light, the lesson to be learned from Shredded 
Wheat is that a term is “generic” and hence not a valid trade name when it has failed to 
acquire or has lost its secondary meaning—when its source-identifying capacity is not or 
is no longer its “primary significance.”  In Shredded Wheat, Justice Brandeis found that 
“shredded wheat” lacked secondary meaning, primarily because it was “the term by 
which the biscuit in pillow-shaped form [was] generally known to the public.”156 Even 
though the term “shredded wheat” apparently retained some degree of source-identifying 
capacity, this was the “subordinate meaning” of the term and not its “primary 
significance.”157 
155 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 99, at § 716 (b) & cmt. b (emphasis added). 
156 305 U.S. at 116-17.  The Court noted that “[f]or many years, there was no attempt to use the term. . . as 
a trade-mark.”  Id.;  see also id. at 117 (noting that, in 1905, the Commissioner of Patents refused to 
register “Shredded Whole Wheat” as a mark under the Ten-Year Clause of the 1905 Act, on grounds that 
“these words accurately and aptly describe an article of food which has been produced for more than ten 
years”) (internal citation omitted). 
157 Id. at 118. 
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Some courts have interpreted Brandeis’ reasoning in this manner and have cited 
Shredded Wheat in support of the common law proposition that if the “primary 
significance” of a term is that of a source identifier (i.e., it has acquired secondary 
meaning), it may be a protectable mark, even if it might otherwise be characterized as 
“generic.”158 However, as noted previously, the modern trend has been to absolutely bar 
any type of trademark protection for “generic” words (under either the Lanham Act or 
common law), and federal opinions holding otherwise have largely been disavowed or 
reversed.159 For example, in Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Co., the First Circuit stated in 
dicta that, although “at common law terms that are generic are normally not subject to 
appropriation as trademarks, . . . a strong showing of secondary meaning may be 
sufficient to grant a right to exclusive use”160 However, in a decision issued one year 
later, the First Circuit disavowed that statement, labeling it an “error” derived from 
“precisely the same error” by Justice Brandeis in Shredded Wheat.161 
In rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the secondary meaning doctrine applied, Justice 
Brandeis wrote that “[t]here is no basis here for applying the doctrine of secondary 
meaning.”162 Most modern courts avoid the perceived “error” described by the First 
Circuit in Keebler by interpreting the above statement by Brandeis as an affirmation of 
the proposition that, if a term is generic, it cannot be protected as a trade mark, regardless 
 
158 See, e.g., American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248, 1251 & 1253 (7th Cir. 
1970) (noting that “in the absence of a strong showing of secondary meaning, a generic name cannot be the 
basis of a trademark”); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Products Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 1962) 
(holding that “[a] mark is not generic merely because it has some significance to the public as an indication 
of the nature or class of an article,” and further “[t]o become generic the principle significance of the word 
must be its [generic meaning], rather than an indication of its origin”). 
159See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906-07 (D.R.I. 1980) 
(rejecting proposition that a term can be “’generic’ in the face of the admitted presence of secondary 
meaning”), rev’d, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981).   
160 624 F.2d 366, 374-75 (1st Cir. 1980). 
161 Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1981). 
162 Id. 
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of whether there is evidence that it has acquired secondary meaning.163 Instead, the 
courts apply the primary significance test to determine whether a word or term is 
“generic” in the first instance, separate from any consideration of secondary meaning.  As 
further discussed below, their attempts to do so have been fraught with difficulty. 
 
3. The Modern Genericism Doctrine:  Who are you?  What are you? 
 
As the primary significance test took hold, courts interpreted it differently and 
struggled to navigate the questions the test poses.  Most modern courts approach the 
question of whether a term is or has become generic by applying a now-familiar test, 
borrowed from the language of scientific classification:  a generic term is one that is, or 
has become, the name of a class of goods or services, the “genus of which the particular 
product or service is a species.”164 Specifically put in the context of the primary 
significance test, the question becomes whether “the primary significance of the 
trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the producer.”165 If so, “the 
 
163 See note 117, supra, and note 188, infra; see also Dinwoodie, supra note 145, at 236 (“As the Court 
noted, the existence of secondary meaning was beside the point once the term was classified as generic.  No 
evidence of plentiful sales or extensive advertising, typical evidence pointing to secondary meaning, could 
alter the unprotectability of the term SHREDDED WHEAT.”). 
164 Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added); see also Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,194 (1985); Abercrombie & Fitch 
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental 
Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979); cf. Arthur J. Greenbaum, Jane C. Ginsburg, & Steven 
M. Weinberg, A Proposal for Evaluating Genericism after “Anti-Monopoly, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 
109-110 (1983) (noting  the “long-standing, widely-embraced fallacy that genericism may be determined 
by dividing the relevant world of goods into genuses and species”).  
165 Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Blinded 
Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“A generic 
term is one commonly used to denote a product or other item or entity, one that indicates the thing itself, 
rather than any particular feature or exemplification of it.”); Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 
Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983) (generic term “connotes the basic nature of articles or services rather 
than the more individualized characteristics of a particular product”) (citation omitted). 
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trademark is a generic term and cannot be a valid trademark.”166 Somewhat curiously, 
some courts have attempted to refine this test by relying upon the “who-are-you/what-
are-you” test:  “A mark answers the buyer's questions ‘Who are you?’  ‘Where do you 
come from?’  ‘Who vouches for you?’  But the generic name of the product answers the 
question ‘What are you?’”167 Although the test may seem simple in its articulation (once 
one gets past the difficulty of making a trademark talk and answer questions), it has 
proved difficult in application.   
 
III. Problems Created by the Current Iteration and Application of the Genericide 
Doctrine 
 
The following section examines some of the key difficulties that have arisen to 
confound courts in the application of the modern genericide doctrine.  In this section we 
argue that the current doctrine over-emphasizes the etymological categorization of words, 
rather than the core questions of (1) whether the mark functions as a source-identifier in a 
commercial context, and (2) whether trademark protection will help or hinder 
competition.  We begin by examining the genus/species and “once generic, always 
generic” precepts that guide courts when determining whether a term is generic and show 
why these approaches lead the doctrine astray. We then explain how current doctrine 
relies on overbroad evidence when making a genericism determination, such that 
 
166 Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. 
167 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Society of Fin. Examiners v. National Ass’n of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 41 F.3d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1995); CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, 531 F.2d 11, 
13 (2d Cir. 1975); Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (E.D. Wash. 
2006); Eagle Snacks, Inc. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 571 (D.N.J. 1985) (describing “who are 
you-what are you” test as “the clearest test for genericness”). 
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trademark holders are forced to waste resources and pursue otherwise noninfringing uses 
as they police their marks. Finally, this section examines the relationship between the 
dilution doctrine’s rights-in-gross, property-based understanding of trademarks to the 
evolution of the genericism doctrine.  
 
A. The Elusive Distinction between Genus and Species, or Generic and 
Descriptive Terms 
 
One of the key conceptual problems in understanding the genericism doctrine and 
indeed trademark law is the way in which the law parses the difference between the name 
of a product class (which is considered generic) and the name of a particular product 
(which may be a valid trademark).  In other words, where do we draw the line between 
genus and species?   Put in the context of the spectrum of marks, the question may 
become whether the mark is generic (and hence incapable of functioning as a trademark) 
because it is the name of a product class, or merely descriptive of a particular product 
within that class of goods or services, in which case the mark may be afforded trademark 
protection upon a showing of secondary meaning.  We argue that this elusive distinction 
should not be the cornerstone of genericism analysis.168 
In theory the distinction between product class and product, or generic and 
descriptive terms, should be simple.  A generic term is the common name for a product or 
product class, which has no ability to function as a source identifier.  In truth, these words 
or terms are rarely if ever the source of trademark litigation.  After all, few companies 
 
168 See also Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1351 (stating that the courts “have made artificial and 
unworkable distinctions with respect to the classification of a trademarked word as generic or descriptive” 
in determining whether to allow proof of secondary meaning); see also Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, 
supra note 164, at 109-110 (noting  the “long-standing, widely-embraced fallacy that genericism may be 
determined by dividing the relevant world of goods into genuses and species”).  
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(and even fewer marketers) are likely to choose names that are obviously generic (e.g., 
cookie, beer, restaurant) to distinguish their goods or services, because they are incapable 
of doing so.  In many cases, however, words or terms are found to be generic (i.e., the 
name of a product class) when, at least to the naked eye, they appear to be descriptive—
that is, they describe the attributes of the good or service to which they are attached:  e.g., 
Lite Beer,169 Filipino Yellow Pages,170 Blinded Veterans Association,171 Warehouse 
Shoes.172 In such cases, it is not difficult to see why the putative trademark holder may 
have been surprised to learn that he had chosen a “generic” name for his business.173 As 
stated previously, a generic term is not protectable as a mark, regardless of whether it has 
acquired secondary meaning among the relevant group of consumers.174 
This scenario may best be understood as the inverse of the “death by patent” 
phenomenon described earlier.  In these cases, a company does not use an arbitrary or 
fanciful name to describe a state-of-the art, newly patented product.  Instead, the 
company uses a common (or arguably descriptive) name that the consumer already 
understands to describe the relevant good or service.  The company extensively markets 
 
169 See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977) (“lite beer” 
found generic). 
170 See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“Filipino Yellow Pages” found generic). 
171 Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Foundation, 872 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(“Blinded Veterans Association” found generic). 
172 See Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Shoe Warehouse” and 
“Warehouse Shoes” found generic). 
173 This difficulty was exacerbated by the Patent and Trademark Office’s creation of yet a third category of 
terms by refusing to register terms that it characterizes as “so highly descriptive” that they cannot function 
as marks, even though they are not “generic.”  See, e.g., In re Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., 224 
U.S.P.Q. 309 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (refusing to register “Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc.,” as applied to 
seminars in industrial relations, on grounds that it was too highly descriptive, regardless of whether it had 
acquired secondary meaning); see generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:22; see also Linda 
McLeod, The Status of So Highly Descriptive and Acquired Distinctiveness, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 607, 
623-27 (1992) (criticizing PTO practice of refusing to register marks on grounds that they are “so highly 
descriptive”).  In the 1997 edition of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, the PTO instructed 
examiners to abandon the practice of refusing to register marks on grounds that they were “so highly 
descriptive” that they could not function as marks.  T.M.E.P. § 1209.01(c) (1997 rev.). 
174 See note 117, supra, and note 188, infra.
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and advertises its good or service, and through its efforts the name attached to the good or 
service acquires secondary meaning in the minds of the consuming public.  In other 
words, even though the name did not act as a source identifier when the company adopted 
it, it evolves to function in this manner, much the same way even an arbitrary or fanciful 
term attached to a newly patented product may evolve into a generic word when it loses 
its ability to function as a source-identifier.  In this type of situation, the mark holder’s 
fate rides on the court’s determination of whether the word or term initially chosen was 
generic or descriptive.  The courts themselves acknowledge that the distinctions between 
categories of marks (e.g., generic v. descriptive, or descriptive v. suggestive) “are less 
than clearly defined and may be difficult to utilize.”175 
Judge Becker of the Third Circuit tackled the question of how to distinguish a 
generic term from a descriptive one in A.J. Canfield Company v. Honickman.176 In 
Canfield the product at issue was Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda.177 The legal issue was 
whether “‘chocolate fudge’ as applied to diet soda” was entitled to federal trademark 
status.178 Judge Becker noted that the question was a difficult one as to which reasonable 
minds not only could disagree but had disagreed, as evidenced by three district courts 
analyzing the question and reaching three different results: suggestive (or at worst 
 
175 Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 979 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Henri’s Food 
Products Co., Inc. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 817 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987) (difference between “common 
descriptive name,” aka generic term, and “merely descriptive mark” often “is not visible to the naked eye”); 
Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(recognizing that “courts often have difficulty in distinguishing between generic and descriptive terms”); 
and note 69, supra.
176 A. J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986). 
177 Id. at 292. 
178 Id.
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descriptive), descriptive, and generic.179 Judge Becker found that “diet chocolate fudge 
soda” was not suggestive because, rather than “requir[ing] imagination, thought or 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods,” the phrase “denote[d] a 
flavor” and consumers would need no imagination to understand the nature of the soda.180 
The court then turned to the question of whether the term was descriptive or generic. 
 To make this determination the court attempted to “define the relevant product 
category, or ‘genus.’”181 Judge Becker found, however, that neither the primary 
significance test nor an examination of consumer perceptions helped determine what he 
held was the first question to understand, namely “whether chocolate soda or chocolate 
fudge soda is the relevant product genus for evaluating genericness.…”182 Judge Becker 
noted that the primary significance test is of no use until one has determined the status of 
the term:  
[T]he primary significance test is generally satisfied if a term signifies a product 
that emanates from a single source, i.e., a product brand, but it is not satisfied if 
the product that emanates from a single source is not only a product brand but is 
also a product genus.   The primary significance test does not, in and of itself, tell 
us how to differentiate a mere product brand from a product genus.183 
In other words, when examining the question of genericness, where the court draws the 
line between genus and species may be somewhat arbitrary and strongly controls if not 
predetermines the outcome of the case.  If the court deems the term in question to denote 
a product category, then it would be considered a genus and hence generic. Yet if the 
court determines that the product is part of a larger category or genus, then it will almost 
 
179 Id. (citing A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D.Ill.1985), aff'd, 796 F.2d 
903 (7th Cir.1986); Canfield v. Concord Beverages Co. (Scirica, J.);  Yoo-Hoo Chocolate Beverages Corp. 
v. A.J. Canfield Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. 653 (D.N.J.1986) (Sarokin, J.)).  
180 A. J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 297-98 (citations omitted). 
181 Id. at 298 (citation omitted). 
182 Id. at 299. 
183 Id. at 301. 
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certainly find that the term is descriptive and can be a trademark if secondary meaning is 
shown.  Under such an approach, the boundaries of genericism are infinitely malleable.184 
Judge Becker elucidated the malleability of the test when he wrote:  “For 
example, in Kellogg, if wheat cereals were the relevant product class, then Shredded 
Wheat would be merely a brand.   But once it was decided that cereals containing pillow-
shaped forms of wheat shreds was the relevant product class, the term ‘shredded wheat’ 
was obviously generic.”185 For this reason, the genus/species distinction is singularly 
unhelpful in notifying a potential trademark holder or her competitor of whether a given 
term will be considered “generic” by the courts. 
The inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of the current system imposes costs 
on both trademark holders and the public.  From the trademark holder’s perspective, the 
prospect of adopting a descriptive mark is a tempting one—once the mark has acquired 
distinctiveness, or secondary meaning (which is presumed after five years of 
“substantially exclusive and continuous use”), it may be registered and entitled to the full 
protections of the Lanham Act.186 Moreover, unlike fanciful or arbitrary marks (or, to a 
lesser degree, even suggestive ones), the descriptive trademark has the added advantage 
of informing the consumer about the attributes of the good or service to which it is 
attached, reducing the need to inform the consumer of these attributes via advertising.187 
However, because the putative trademark holder (even one with a highly-paid legal staff) 
arguably has no real way of knowing whether a descriptive term will be characterized as 
a genus (i.e., generic and hence invalid) or descriptive of a species, he runs the risk of 
 
184 See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 164, at 110 (characterizing the genus-species test as 
a “meaningless” and “infinitely manipulable” classification attempt).
185 A. J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d  at 301 n. 12. 
186 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (f).  
187 See note 87 and accompanying text, supra. 
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losing the considerable investment that he may have made in establishing secondary 
meaning.  Because secondary meaning is presumptively acquired after five years of use, 
many trademark holders wait this period of time before even attempting to register an 
arguably descriptive trademark.  As a result, five years of advertising and accumulated 
goodwill may go down the proverbial drain.  
Consumers lose in this scenario as well.  When a trademark holder invests 
considerable sums of money to create secondary meaning—in other words, to create a 
connection between a particular product or source and the mark in the mind of the 
consuming public—not surprisingly, she often succeeds.  When secondary meaning is 
established and the putative mark is functioning as a source-identifier, confusion and 
inefficiency may result when the mark is deemed “generic” and free for all to use. 
 
B. Once Generic, Always Generic 
 
In addition to the inherent uncertainties in determining whether a term is or has 
become generic, another troublesome feature of the modern doctrine is the permanence of 
that determination.  Although one might assume that, all things being equal, if a 
trademark can transmute from arbitrary or fanciful to generic because it no longer 
functions as a mark (i.e., it is no longer a source identifier), it should be able to travel in 
the other direction—from generic to at least some type of protectable mark if it functions 
as one in the minds of the consuming public.  Such an assumption, however, would be 
incorrect, at least in the context of modern trademark law.  Under these circumstances the 
mark is said to have acquired only “de facto” secondary meaning, which is the legal 
equivalent of no secondary meaning:  “No amount of purported proof that a generic term 
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has acquired a secondary meaning associating it with a particular producer can transform 
that term into a registrable trademark.”188 
For example, in Harley-Davidson Inc. v. Grottanelli,189 in which the term “HOG” 
was deemed generic, “[s]urveys of motorcycle enthusiasts in the trial record reflected a 
ninety-eight percent association of HOG with Harley.”190 Yet, the court found that the 
term was generic prior to Harley-Davidson’s first use of it as a mark in the 1980’s, 
largely based on dictionary definitions of the term dating back to 1967 and usage of the 
term by the media in 1935.191 As a result, even though the “primary significance” of 
HOG in 1999 was that of a source-identifier (i.e., a trademark), it legally could not 
function as one.192 The court reasoned that “[t]he public has no more right than a 
manufacturer to withdraw from the language a generic term, already applicable to the 
relevant category of products, and accord it trademark significance, at least as long as the 
term retains some generic meaning.”193 The fact that HOG as applied to motorcycles 
would ordinarily be considered an arbitrary and hence highly distinctive mark made no 
difference.194 
In another recent example, defendant Lindows.com argued that Microsoft 
Corporation’s trademark “Windows,” as applied to operating software, was a generic 
 
188 Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (1st Cir. 1980); see also note 117, supra.
189 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999). 
190 Jerre B. Swann, Genericism Rationalized, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 639, 654 (1999) (citing Grotanelli 
Appellate Record at A76).  See also Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80 n. 6 (noting that “even if the mark 
is descriptive there is enough evidence of secondary meaning to support the District Court’s order [holding 
that the mark was valid and infringed]”, but reversing on the ground that “light beer” or “lite beer” is a 
generic name). 
191 Harley-Davidson, Inc., 164 F.3d at 810-11 & n. 8, 10; see also id. at n. 2 (citing media usage of the term 
throughout 1960’s and 1970’s). 
192 See also Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80 n.6.        
193 Harley-Davidson, Inc.,164 F.3d at 812.  The court concluded that the term HOG retained generic 
meaning based on dictionary definitions of the term in 1992.  Id. at 810-11 & n. 9.     
194 Id. at 810 (“No manufacturer can take out of the language a word, even a slang term, that has 
generic meaning as to a category of products and appropriate it for its own trademark use,”). 
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term, unprotectable as a trademark, because it was used generically by the public when 
Microsoft adopted it in the 1980’s.  The district court refused to grant summary judgment 
on this issue, due to the existence of disputed issues of fact.  It ultimately held, however, 
that it would instruct the jury to “consider whether the Windows mark was generic during 
the period before Microsoft Windows 1.0 entered the marketplace in November 1985” 
and would “not instruct the jury that even if Windows were generic prior to November 
1985, the trademark would nonetheless be valid today so long as the primary significance 
of the term today is not generic.”195 In short, the jury would be told that a generic term 
was not capable of achieving trademark status, even if its “primary significance,” in the 
mind of the consuming public, was that of a source-identifier. Less than six months after 
the court rendered this decision, Microsoft and Lindows entered into a “global 
settlement” under which Microsoft agreed to pay Lindows $20 million to relinquish its 
name and all related Web domains to Microsoft.196 
Although some courts, including the Second Circuit in Grotanelli, have suggested 
that it may be possible for generic terms to evolve into protectable trademarks, few have 
so held. 197 Even those courts that have recognized the possibility of such a 
transformation have refused to apply the “primary significance” test to determine the 
status of the mark in question; instead, they have suggested that formerly generic terms 
 
195 Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 2004 WL 329250 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (emphasis in original).   
196 Joris Evers, Microsoft to Pay $20M to End Lindows Trademark Battle, Jul. 19, 2004, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/07/19/Hnmslindowstrademark_1.html. 
197 The Grotanelli court suggested that “if a generic word could ever be infused with trademark 
significance, the word must have ceased to have current generic meaning.” 164 F.3d at 811.  See also New 
Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
“[a]n interesting question is whether a word, although once generic, may become protectable”) (dicta). 
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may function as marks only when the generic meaning of the term has been completely 
obliterated from the public consciousness.198 
The courts have been slightly more receptive to the idea that generic words may 
become protectable trademarks, upon acquisition of secondary meaning, when the 
generic word is being “reclaimed” by the former trademark holder—i.e., the word or term 
began its life as a trademark; fell victim to genericide; and then came full circle back to 
its former trademark status.199 Even these types of cases have been characterized as 
“extraordinarily rare.”200 The two most commonly cited examples of trademarks that 
resurfaced from the public domain are “Singer” for sewing machines201 and “Goodyear” 
for tires.202 More recently, the Federal Circuit held that Opryland could introduce 
evidence that the term “opry,” as applied to country music entertainment, was not 
 
198 See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Where a generic 
association of a word or term has become obsolete and is discoverable only by resort to historical sources 
or dictionaries compiled on historical principles to preserve from oblivion obsolete words, then, from the 
viewpoint of trademark and like law, the word or term is no longer a generic word.”). 
199See, e.g., Grotanelli, 164 F.3d at 811 (distinguishing such cases on the basis that the words at issue “were 
originally proper names of the manufacturer”).   
200 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:30. 
201 See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that Singer had 
“recaptured from the public domain the name ‘Singer’” and therefore the name had become (again) a “valid 
trademark . . . entitled to protection as such”); cf. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 183 
(1896) (finding that the name “Singer” had come “to indicate, in its primary sense, to the public, the class 
and type of machines made by the Singer Company. . . and thus this name constituted their generic 
description”). 
202 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Minn. 1965) (holding 
that plaintiff had “met its burden of proof on the issue of secondary meaning” and therefore had a 
protectable trademark); cf. Goodyear’s Rubber Manuf’g Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 603 
(1888) (holding that “Goodyear Rubber” is not “capable of exclusive appropriation” because it is 
“descriptive of a class of good and therefore generic”). 
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generic,203 even though the Eighth Circuit had held that it was a generic term just ten 
years earlier.204 
The “once generic, always generic” tenet of trademark law is problematic from an 
economic perspective, as it effectively increases consumer search costs.   If the “primary 
significance” of a term in the commercial context is that of a source identifier, consumers 
generally do not benefit when competitors are allowed to use the word generically.205 As 
one commentator has observed, “[E]rroneously failing to protect the word when it in fact 
serves as a source-identifying mark might be very costly if consumers end up confused 
about a competing firm's product.”206 
C. The Overbroad Scope of Evidence that Contributes to a Trademark’s 
Demise 
Perhaps because the “test” for identifying a generic term is such an elusive and 
arguably arbitrary one, courts turn to various sources of circumstantial evidence to assist 
them in making this determination.  Such evidence typically includes dictionary 
definitions of the word or words used in the mark; uses of the mark by and in the media; 
and other types of non-competitive uses.  We contend that this type of evidence is of little 
 
203 Opryland U.S.A. Inc. v. Great American Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 853 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also 
Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Gilmore Entertainment Group, LLC, 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 942 (M.D. Tenn. 
2002) (holding that plaintiff is “not collaterally estopped [by the 8th Circuit’s decision in Hilton, finding the 
term ‘Opry” to be generic] from litigating the primary significance to the relevant public of the term ‘Opry’ 
today”). 
204 WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir. 1984). 
205 See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (acknowledging that 
“[t]o determine that a trademark is generic and thus pitch it into the public domain is a fateful step” which 
“may confuse consumers who continue to associate the trademark with the owner’s brand”). 
206 Bone, supra note 49, at 2123.  Professor Bone contends that, in this type of scenario, the cost of a “false 
negative error”—a ruling that errantly denies trademark protection—is much higher than the cost of a 
“false positive error,” a ruling that errantly grants trademark protection.  Id. As a result, Professor Bone 
reasons that, from the perspective of avoiding error cost, “a rule that reduces the frequency of false 
negatives even as it increases the frequency of false positives is likely to be superior. . ., as long as the latter 
effect is not too great.”  Id. 
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value in enabling the court to answer what should be the core question in any genericism 
determination:  whether the mark is functioning as a source-identifier in the relevant 
commercial context.  At best, it demonstrates that the word or term is or may be 
functioning as a hybrid trademark, while shedding little light on which understanding of 
the term constitutes its “primary significance” to the consumer in a commercial context.  
Moreover, the current doctrine’s insistence that trademark holders “police” against 
noncompetitive, noninfringing uses of their marks leads to overly aggressive trademark 
enforcement activities, which are inefficient and, perhaps more importantly, may have the 
undesirable effect of stifling the public’s ability to use language as it sees fit.  
 
1. Problems created by trademark policing 
 
As noted above, under the current genericide doctrine, uses of a mark by 
dictionaries, yellow pages, newspapers, and other non-competing sources reflecting 
public understanding of a term are used to demonstrate that a term is generic rather than 
source identifying.207 Though mark holders can and should diligently police their marks 
against competitive misuse, mark holders cannot (and, we argue, should not) try to stop 
dictionaries, yellow pages, newspapers, and other non-competing third parties from using 
 
207 See, e.g., Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grotanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 809 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing dictionary 
definition of “hog” as evidence that “hog” is a generic term); Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal 
Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing use of the term “Filipino yellow pages” in a Los 
Angeles Times article and in the dictionary as evidence of the term’s genericness); Mil-Mar Shoe Co., Inc. 
v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d 1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing dictionary definition of “warehouse” as 
evidence that “Shoe Warehouse” and “Warehouse Shoes” are generic terms); Miller Brewing Co. v. 
G.Heilman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing definition of “light” and the “misspelled 
equivalent” as evidence that “lite” is a generic term); Retail Services, Inc. v. Freebies Publishing, 364 F.3d. 
535, 544-545 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing dictionary definition of “freebie” as evidence that it is a generic term); 
cf. Natron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 407 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the absence of a 
dictionary definition for “Smart power” is not conclusive evidence that the term is not generic). 
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words that are trademarks in ways other than as a mark.208 This behavior constitutes fair 
use of the mark and should be encouraged, not discouraged, by the courts.  Furthermore, 
as discussed above, the nature of language is such that people will adapt words as they 
see fit209 and trademarks used in their expressive capacity constitute a public good that 
we wish to encourage rather than suppress. 
Therefore, the question arises as to why the case law insists that mark holders 
must “police” their marks in these contexts.  After all, one person’s policing is another 
person’s harassment, or worse, abusive trademark litigation.210 There are costs to 
engaging in these types of policing strategies, both from the standpoint of the trademark 
holder and of the public. 
2. The cost of policing from the perspective of the trademark holder 
 
Through various means trademark holders strive to maintain their marks’ source-
identifying qualities, and for good reason.  The Lanham Act specifies that failure to do so 
results in the death of the mark:  “A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’. . . [w]hen 
any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission,
causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection 
with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.”211 Trademark 
holders who do not pursue infringers may be contributing to the death of their marks via 
genericide.  As one court has explained, “Without question, distinctiveness can be lost by 
 
208 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 12:28; accord Illinois High School Ass'n v. GTE Vantage, Inc., 99 F.3d 
244, 246 (7th Cir. 1996). 
209 See notes 50-54 and accompanying text, supra.
210 See generally Greene, supra note 9.  As discussed below, although there is not currently a doctrine of 
trademark misuse, Judge Posner has recognized that a copyright holder using litigation to gain rights she 
does not have is engaging in abuse of process.  See Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC, v. Wiredata, 
Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). 
211 See 15 U.S.C. § 112 (emphasis added). 
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failing to take action against infringers. If there are numerous products in the marketplace 
bearing the alleged mark, purchasers may learn to ignore the ‘mark’ as a source 
identification.  When that occurs, the conduct of the former holder, by failing to police its 
mark, can be said to have caused the mark to lose its significance as a mark.”212 
Unchallenged use of a mark by competitors understandably contributes to the 
genericide of a mark.  To refer back to our grocery store example, if all the teriyaki 
sauces on the shelf are labeled soy vays and the maker of the “real” Soy Vay® does not 
object, the brand loses its source-identifying significance.  Soy Vay no longer signals the 
consumer that she is buying a particular type of sauce with a hefty kick of ginger; instead 
it merely tells her that she is buying teriyaki sauce.  Therefore, the courts’ insistence on 
the mark holder’s duty to police the mark in this context makes sense.  As noted above, 
however, courts consider much more than this type of evidence in determining whether a 
mark holder has “abandoned” her mark and hence contributed to its death via genericide.   
Although mark holders have no legal right to dictate the manner in which 
newspapers and dictionaries utilize and portray their marks, they are expected to expend 
resources in this quixotic and potentially harmful endeavor.  Judge Posner writes: 
A serious trademark holder is assiduous in endeavoring to convince 
dictionary editors, magazine and newspaper editors, journalists and 
columnists, judges, and other lexicographically influential persons to 
avoid using his trademark to denote anything other than the trademarked 
good or service.213 
Yet, use of a trademark as a common noun or verb, in a noncommercial context, does not 
have the same direct impact on a mark’s source-identifying capacity as does an infringing 
 
212 Wallpaper Mfrs., Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1982); accord 
Malaco Leaf, AB v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 355, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rossner v. 
CBS, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
213 Illinois High School Ass’n, 99 F.3d at 246. 
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use by the trademark holder’s competitor.  Such noncommercial uses typically indicate 
that the mark in functioning in a hybrid function (a fate that is practically inevitable for 
the most famous trademarks). Very few people decide how to use a word by first 
consulting the dictionary or by blindly mimicking the way a reporter used the word in 
Newsweek or The New York Times. Dictionary entries and media uses certainly may 
reflect some of the ways in which a term is used.  These noncommercial uses of a 
trademark are, however, poor barometers of the consumer’s perception of the mark in 
commercial contexts and – unlike competitive misuse of the mark – they do not 
necessarily affect consumer perceptions in commercial settings.  Thus, with our 
understanding that people will use language as they see fit, it is inefficient to require 
trademark holders to engage in the cat-herding endeavor of “policing” these types of 
noncommercial uses.214 
Nonetheless, trademark holders—particularly those who own “famous” marks— 
have taken Judge Posner’s advice and often pursue expensive “education” strategies to 
combat noncommercial “misuse” of their marks.215 Xerox, for example, engaged in a 
massive advertising campaign to educate consumers about the “proper” use of its mark.  
One such advertisement depicts a graveyard of trademarks, including escalator, 
trampoline, cube steak, lanolin, dry ice, raisin bran, nylon, mimeograph, shredded wheat, 
yo-yo, kerosene, cornflakes, and high octane.216 At the top of the ad, copy reads in bold, 
 
214 See also Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1354 (noting that these types of policing efforts are 
inefficient in that they do not “stimulate demand for a firm’s product”).    
215 On this point Professors Folsom and Teply conclude that the need to engage in these types of policing 
efforts may signal the mark’s drift from trademark to generic term.  In other words, according to Folsom 
and Teply, such actions signal that the term is already losing its strength as a mark, and a court should 
consider the necessity of such policing efforts as a sign of that decline.  Id. 
216 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Jessica Litman, and Mary L. Kelvin, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 317 (3d ed. 2001). 
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“Once a trademark, not always a trademark.”217 Under that lead, the copy tells the tale of 
the dead trademarks: “They were once proud trademarks, now they’re just names. They 
failed to take precautions that would have helped them have a long and prosperous 
life.”218 The copy then seeks the reader’s help to keep Xerox from suffering this fate by 
asking the reader to use Xerox as an adjective, never as a verb or noun.219 This concern is 
not only one for Xerox or a recent phenomenon; Kodak sponsored a similar advertising 
campaign in 1920,220 and many others have engaged in analogous efforts.221 
In addition to noncommercial uses, courts may also consider the existence of 
other commercial, yet non-infringing, uses of the same or a similar mark to be evidence 
that a word or term is generic.222 For example, in Filipino Yellow Pages, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, on summary judgment, that the mark “Filipino 
Yellow Pages”—as applied to an advertisers’ phone directory marketed to the Filipino-
American community in California—was generic, not descriptive, based partly on 
evidence that the mark holder “did not bring suit to challenge the marketing of . . . a 
second Filipino Yellow Pages to the Filipino-American community on the East Coast.”223 
It seems fairly clear that, if such a suit had been brought, it would have been unsuccessful 
 
217 Id.  
218 Id.  
219 Id.  
220 Id. at 319. 
221 See id. at 319-328 (showing advertising combating genericism sponsored by Weight Watchers®; 
Tabasco®; Realtor®; Kimberly-Clark Corporation’s Kleenex®; Huggies®; Depends®; Freedom®; 
Delsey® and Kotex® brands; Bacardi®; Plexiglass®; Levi’s®; American Express®; and Rolls-Royce®). 
222 See, e.g. Natron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (use of a term “by 
third parties in trademark registrations” may be considered evidence of term’s genericness);  Van Well 
Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1331 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (evidence of public 
understanding of a term may be obtained from “any competent source,” including third parties’ use of the 
term); March Madness Athletic Ass’n, LLC v. Netfire, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 560, 572 (N.D. Tex. 2001) 
(finding that “the frequent use of March Madness for events and phenomena having nothing to do with 
basketball also raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MMA has a protectable right to the 
phrase”; citing use of “March Madness” in conjunction with “legislative activity, polka festivals, and sales 
or specials on cars, furniture, and electronic equipment” as examples).;  
223 Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Pubs, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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if not downright frivolous.  Paper phone directories are targeted to a local audience, for 
obvious reasons; very few people in New York City need to use the Los Angeles phone 
directory.  Therefore, little to no likelihood of confusion arises when two phone 
directories, on opposite Coasts, use the same name.  Trademark holders should not be 
encouraged or pressured to bring frivolous lawsuits.224 
In any event, it is unclear why non-competing third-party uses of the same or a 
similar name should be considered relevant to a determination that a given name is 
generic. As discussed above, a truly generic term has no source-identifying significance 
and therefore is an unlikely and unwise choice for a brand name.  Descriptive names, 
however, can act as source identifiers, through acquired distinctiveness; are protectable as 
trademarks under the Lanham Act if they have acquired distinctiveness; and have the 
added benefit of telling the public about the attributes of the good or service to which 
they are attached.225 Commercial uses of the same or similar marks in noninfringing 
contexts—sometimes referred to as “third party uses” of the mark—are and should be 
considered evidence that the term is descriptive rather than inherently distinctive,226 but 
such uses do not prove and should not even suggest that the term is generic.     
 
224 Cf. What-A-Burger, VA v. Whataburger Corp. Christi, TX, 357 F.3d 44, 448-521 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(affirmative defenses of laches and acquiescence did not apply, despite junior user’s unchallenged use of 
the mark for 32 years, because such use was not likely infringing due to geographic distance between 
markets of junior and senior user); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th 
Cir.1996) (trademark owner has “no obligation to sue” until likelihood of confusion is imminent).  
225 Descriptive marks are the weakest type of protectable mark.  See notes 82-87 and accompanying text, 
supra. Some commentators argue, for various reasons, that descriptive terms, like generic ones, should not 
be protectable as trademarks.  See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment,
70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003) (arguing that extending trademark protection to descriptive marks violates 
the First Amendment).  
226 See, e.g., Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 793 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(characterizing “the extent to which a term actually has been used by others marketing a similar service or 
product” as the “final barometer of the descriptiveness of a particular term”); see also Vision Center v. 
Opticks, Inc., 506 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing widespread use of “vision center” by optical stores 
across the nation as evidence of the term’s descriptiveness); Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Investing Banking 
Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing evidence that eighty competitors used the word “invest” 
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The genericide doctrine’s focus on noncommercial, noninfringing uses diverts the 
trademark holder’s attention away from brand building and other activities that may 
enhance the mark’s capacity as a source identifier. 227 Instead, it pressures them to 
expend money and goodwill on quixotic endeavors ranging from “education campaigns” 
designed to change the way the public uses the English language, to frivolous threats of 
litigation or lawsuits aimed at noninfringing or fair uses of their marks.228 This aspect of 
the genericide doctrine harms not only trademark holders, but also those who become the 
targets of the hyper-enforcement activities that result.  Any type of weak or, at worst, 
frivolous litigation (or threat of litigation) is costly and should be discouraged or 
sanctioned, not encouraged, by legal doctrine. 
 
3. The negative effect of trademark policing on the public’s right to 
use trademarks expressively 
 
As noted previously, many valid trademarks—particularly the most famous ones— 
can and do function expressively.229 In other words, even though a trademark may 
function as a source-identifier in a commercial context, it may have other meanings and 
uses as well.  It should not be surprising that “hybrid” trademarks exist.  After all, few 
 
in their trademarks as evidence that “investacorp” is descriptive); King-Size, Inc. v. Frank’s King Size 
Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp 1138, 1155 (D.C. Tex. 1982) (noting widespread use of “king size” to refer to 
large clothing and shoes as evidence that the term is descriptive); cf. Blendco, Inc. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 
132 Fed Appx. 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding the term “Better-N-Butter” to be suggestive, where only 
two other companies had used the term to describe a “nondairy butter-flavored oil”) (unpublished); 
Security Center, Ltd. v. First National Security Centers, 750 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Security 
Center” used in reference to business that houses private storage vaults found suggestive when only twelve 
out of 105 members of the relevant trade association used the term to describe similar services). 
227 See Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1354; see also id. (contending that the need to engage in these 
types of policing efforts may signal that the term is losing its strength as a mark, and that courts should 
consider the necessity of such policing efforts as a sign of that decline). 
228 Accord Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d at 647  (acknowledging that copyright owners using litigation as a 
method of obtaining rights beyond the scope of copyright engage in an abuse of process) 
229 See notes 50-54 and accompanying text, supra.
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words have only one meaning.  For example, the word “snow” is defined as (1) 
“precipitation in the form of . . . white ice crystals”; (2) “a dessert made of stiffly beaten 
whites of eggs, sugar, and fruit pulp”; (3) cocaine or heroin; or (4) “to deceive, persuade, 
or charm glibly.”230 Even though definitions 2-4 are fairly clearly derived from the first 
definition of the word “snow,” their existence does not undermine or call into question 
the validity of the word “snow” as it refers to fluffy, white, frozen precipitation.  We 
determine the meaning of the word by the context in which it is used.  Despite trademark 
holders’ best efforts to the contrary, a trademark is much like any other word, and 
therefore its meaning and use—depending on the context—will evolve over time.231 
The law recognizes and protects the expressive use of trademarks under the doctrine 
of fair use.  The Lanham Act provides that if a trademark is used “otherwise than as a 
mark,” then such use is not actionable.232 Therefore, if a trademark is being used 
expressively—not as a source identifier—then such use is not actionable by the 
trademark holder.  The Act’s recognition and protection of fair use directly reflects a core 
principal of trademark law:  trademarks are not held “in gross.”233 The public has a right 
to use trademarks in this manner. 
As discussed above, the genericide doctrine’s characterization of noncommercial, 
noninfringing uses of a trademark as evidence that the mark has become generic 
incentivizes trademark holders (directly and indirectly) to “police” these types of uses.  
While the “education campaigns” discussed above may be viewed as relatively harmless 
 
230 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1117 (1983). 
231 See Clankie, supra note 56, at 262 (“Language change and innovation are natural and, in general, 
unmanageable.”). 
232 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2005). 
233 See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“In truth, a trade-mark 
confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the 
protection of one’s good-will in trade. . . .”); accord Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 
413-14 (1916). 
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(except to the extent that the cost of such campaigns is passed along to the consumer), 
other trademark policing efforts have a more direct and negative effect on consumers.  
Frivolous lawsuits are the most obvious example of this type of behavior; however, most 
trademark holders do not have to resort to such measures.  Typically, just the threat of 
litigation (even when ever so lightly implied) by a corporate giant is sufficient to dissuade 
a person from making fair use of a trademark.234 Although trademark law does not 
recognize the doctrine of trademark misuse,235 Judge Posner has recognized the 
possibility of abusive litigation or “misuse” in the copyright context.  The same reasoning 
applies to trademark law.  To paraphrase Judge Posner, “[a trademark] owner[’s] use 
[of]] an infringement suit to obtain property protection … that [trademark] law clearly 
does not confer, hoping to force a settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an 
opponent that may lack the resources or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an 
abuse of process.”236 
One Web site, Chilling Effects (www.chillingeffects.org) maintains a growing
database of more than 1700 cease and desist letters covering the full range of intellectual
property law. These cease and desist letters demonstrate that trademark holders often
threaten to sue in cases which—at least in the eyes of a person familiar with trademark
law—would be demonstrably frivolous. These trademark holders often claim a fear of
234 Of course, sometimes such policing efforts have the opposite effect.  Online lexicographer Paul 
McFedries, after receiving letters from Google requesting that he recognize Google as a trademark, chose 
to note Google as a trademark while listing evidence of generic uses of the term, including uses in the 
Chicago Tribune, The Denver Post, and the Telegraph-Herald. Furthermore, the site links to Google 
derived words and phrases, such as Google bombing, Googlejuice, and Googleverse, as well as noting 
some use the term “google” to mean to search for anything at all.  See WordSpy at 
http://www.wordspy.com/words/google.asp (last visited April 3, 2006).  WordSpy is a lexicography Web 
site “devoted to lexpionage, the sleuthing of new words and phrases. These aren't ‘stunt words’ or 
‘sniglets,’ but new terms that have appeared multiple times in newspapers, magazines, books, Web sites, 
and other recorded sources.” Wordspy Home Page,  http://www.wordspy.com/ (last visited April 3, 2006). 
235 See Association of American Medical Colleges v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp.2d 11, 18-19 
(D.D.C. 2004); Juno Online Services, L.P., v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp 684. 690 (N. D. Ill. 1997). 
236 Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d at 647. 
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genericism as the driving force behind such threats. The Lego Group’s letter to the
operator of a Lego fan site, located at “www.ratemylego.com” and
“www.ratemylegos.com,” is an example.237 The letter informs the fan that “our
trademarks must never be used descriptively or generically (i.e., Legos), but must always
be used as an adjective followed by a descriptive noun (e.g., LEGO® toys) and must
never be combined with other words (with or without a hyphen) to form a new word.”238
The letter then claims that the fan’s registration of the www.ratemylego.com and
www.ratemylegos.com domain names constitutes trademark infringement, and then
requests that he “immediately and permanently cease” using the domain names, and that
he agree never to register them again.239 Lego’s Fair Play policy, a “Legal Notice”
regarding its intellectual property rights posted on the Lego Web site, specifies that “[t]he
Lego trademark cannot be used in an Internet address,” on the theory that doing so would
create the “misleading impression that the LEGO Group sponsored the homepage.”240
Moreover, the Fair Play policy “insists” that “the LEGO logo NEVER be used on an 
unofficial web site,” regardless of context.241 
237 Posting of Leggo that Domain Name to, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1076 (Dec. 16, 2003).  Another Lego related 
letter may be found at Chilling Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=517.
238 Posting of Leggo that Domain Name to 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1076 (Dec. 16, 2003).  Other letters with 
similar rationales include ones from Wiley Publishing, Inc. regarding its For Dummies series:  “If the mark 
is used by too many different sources, it becomes a ‘generic’ term, and Wiley may lose its exclusive right 
to use it.” Chilling Effects,  http://www.chillingeffects.org/protest/notice.cgi?NoticeID=355 (Jul. 15, 2002).  
Sun MicroSystem’s letter regarding its Java mark provides another example:   “Like all trademarks, ‘Java’ 
should not be used as a noun, but instead should be used as an adjective. Please use an appropriate generic 
descriptor, for example, ‘technology,’ after each Java based trademark.”  Chilling Effects, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=231. 
239Chilling Effects, http://www.chillingeffects.org/domain/notice.cgi?NoticeID=1076 (Dec. 16, 2003). 
240 Lego.com, Fair Play, Please, http://www.lego.com/eng/info/default.asp?page=fairplay&bhcp=1 (last 
visited Jun. 1, 2006). 
241 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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In this case, the former fan242 was not infringing the Lego trademark, as he was not
using the mark “as a mark”—his use of the mark would almost certainly be characterized
as a nominative fair use.243 Moreover, because he was not selling anything or competing
with Lego in any way on the site, he probably was not “using” the mark at all, as “use”
has been defined under the Lanham Act.244 The Lego Group undoubtedly knows that it
does not have an absolute right to control when and how its trademark is used in the
context of a domain name or a Web site, yet it attempts to suppress all such uses, at least
in part due to concerns about genericide.245 This behavior inhibits speech that should be
encouraged and protected by the Lanham Act.
D. The Dilution Connection 
One other unfortunate side effect of the current version of the genericide 
doctrine—particularly its emphasis on noninfringing, noncommercial uses of trademarks 
as evidence of genericism—has been the expansion and legitimation of the oft-
 
242 Lego’s policing efforts in this case prompted the once-enthusiastic Lego fan to create a link on the 
www.ratemylego.com and www.ratemylegos.com domain names to a separate Web page denoted 
“legogroupsucks.com” and “saynotolegos.com.”  In it he argues that “companies who purposely use the 
law to try to intimidate domain holders into surrendering their names under frivolous claims are un-ethical.  
[ ] These people have no trouble alienating their fans for the sake of profit. Sadly I contributed to the 
revenue of the company and thus indirectly to the salaries of the lawyers who now try to take my domain. 
Instead of spending the past week having fun and building my lego toys, I am forced to waste my time 
protesting the company who makes the toys I love. For these reasons, Lego group sucks; along with all the 
other companies who try to bully good-faith domain holders out of their names.”  Lego Sucks, 
http://legogroupsucks.com/ (Jan. 2, 2004). 
243 The Ninth Circuit recognized the nominative fair use doctrine in New Kids on the Block v. News 
America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).  In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
newspaper did not infringe the New Kids on the Block trademark by conducting a telephone poll inviting 
readers to vote for their favorite New Kid.  Id. at 307-09. 
244 See Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679-680(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
www.bosleymedical.com, a Web site highly critical of the mark owner, did not infringe or dilute the 
BOSLEY MEDICAL trademark, because it did not constitute commercial use of the mark). 
245 The Lego Group’s Fair Play policy and cease-and-desist letter may also be interpreted to reveal a 
broader agenda of claiming  rights “in gross” to its trademark, divorced from any legitimate concern about 
genericide.  See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1032 (noting that, when acting under a property-based conception 
of trademark rights, trademark holders “seek out and punish virtually any use of an intellectual property 
right by another”). 
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criticized246 dilution doctrine.  Even though genericide is a relatively rare (though not 
always unsuccessful) basis for a dilution claim, 247 in reality it is inherently linked to the 
justification for the existence of a dilution cause of action. 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) accords the holder of a “famous”248 
trademark the right to enjoin a commercial use of its mark that “causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark.”249 “Dilution” is defined as “the lessening of the capacity 
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence 
or absence of (1) competition between the famous mark and other parties, or (2) 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”250 As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
“[u]nlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not 
the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an interest in 
 
246See, e.g., Klieger, supra note 4. 
247See, e.g., Selchow & Richter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 580 F.2d 25, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(upholding district court’s finding of irreparable injury based on theory that defendant’s use of “Scrabble” 
in “The Complete Scrabble Dictionary” could render plaintiff’s mark generic); Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. 
Kalvin, 619 F. Supp. 849, 859 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“[t]he anti-dilution statute in no way restricts the right to 
advertise a claim that one’s product is as good as a better known brand but one may not do it in a way that 
risks turning the latter into a generic term”); Norton Co. v. Newage Industries Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
382, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14289 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (use of the words “Tygon-type tubing” in defendant’s 
promotional materials infringed plaintiff’s Tygon mark and constituted unfair competition because such use 
was “calculated or likely to cause [plaintiff’s] mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin”); cf. 
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting theory of dilution that would allow mark 
owners to enjoin mark usage solely because such use may “threaten to render the mark generic”); 
Diversified Marketing, Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting 
argument that advertising slogan, “If You Like ESTEE LAUDER. . . You’ll Love Beauty USA” diluted 
Estee Lauder mark by tending to make it generic); see generally David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining 
Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 558-66 (1991) (criticizing theory of dilution by genericide). 
248 See note 31, supra.
249 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (noting that, 
according to the legislative history, the FTDA is designed to “to protect famous trademarks from 
subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a 
likelihood of confusion”) (internal citation omitted). 
250 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  The FTDA was enacted in 1995; however, dilution has existed as a state law cause of 
action for many years.  See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code  § 14330 (providing for injunctive relief upon a 
showing of “[l]ikelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark. . 
. notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the 
source of goods or services”). 
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protecting consumers.”251 Dilution has been characterized as treading “very close to 
granting rights in gross in a trademark.”252 The theory of dilution by blurring has been 
explained as follows: 
If one small user can blur the sharp focus of the famous mark to uniquely 
signify one source, then another and another small user can and will do so. 
Like being stung by a hundred bees, significant injury is caused by the 
cumulative effect. . . .  This is consistent with the classic view that the 
injury caused by dilution is the gradual diminution or whittling away of 
the value of the famous mark by blurring uses by others.253 
When Congress enacted the FTDA, it cited “the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, 
and KODAK pianos” as examples of dilution that would be actionable under the 
statute.254 
If one “whittles away” at a stick for an extended period of time, the stick will 
ultimately be reduced to a pile of wood shavings.  Similarly, at least in theory, the result 
of a persistent course of dilution will be the genericide or disappearance of the trademark.  
Even though genericide is not commonly stated as a specific ground for a dilution 
claim,255 the two doctrines are therefore inextricably linked, at least in the mind of the 
trademark holder.  When attempting to “police” a trademark, some mark holders tend to 
conflate the two concepts, as amply illustrated by this language from a cease-and-desist 
letter: 
In short, this trademark is an extremely valuable asset of our company and we
want to protect it against dilution. For your information, dilution is a relatively
new area of law, which requires the owner of a trademark to protect it against
"erosion" and/or dilution. Some famous examples of trademark dilution are
251 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429. 
252 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
253 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449  (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 34, § 
24:94); see also General Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Mich. 
2004). 
254 H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 1030 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1030. 
255 See note 247, supra. 
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Kleenex tissues, Xeroxing, Scotch Tape and Aspirin, as these marks were not
protected by their respective owners and today have become almost generic terms.
[O]ur goal is to prevent such ‘generalization’ from happening to our trademarks.256
Both genericide and dilution are driven, at least in part, by the idea that uses of a 
mark in noncommercial257 and/or noninfringing contexts necessarily deplete the mark’s 
ability to function as a source identifier, and/or constitute evidence that the mark has lost 
its source-identifying significance.  As explained both above and below, we believe that 
this effect has been overstated, and moreover that the cost of preventing or “policing” 
against such uses exceeds any benefit that is derived from it.     
 
IV. A Modest Proposal to Reform the Genericism Doctrine 
As explained above, we contend that the current version of the genericism 
doctrine is inherently flawed and requires reform.  The following section presents our 
proposal for a revised understanding and implementation of the doctrine, one which we 
believes more effectively balances the rights of trademark holders and the public, and 
which better reflects the core purposes of trademark law:  (1) protection against consumer 
confusion, and (2) preservation and optimization of efficiency and competition.   
We argue that the genericism doctrine’s primary focus should shift from the 
elusive genus/species distinction to the question of whether the putative mark is 
functioning as a source identifier in the context of the relevant marketplace.  If it is not 
 
256 http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=149; see also IDG letter to UCO Lick 
Observatory, http://www.chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=474 (using same language). 
257 While uses of a mark in noncommercial settings (e.g., by the media or dictionaries) may arguably dilute 
the distinctive qualities of a mark, they are not actionable, as the FTDA applies only to “commercial use in 
commerce” of a mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), and it recognizes the affirmative defense of fair use for 
“noncommercial use” of the mark, use by the news media, and use in comparative advertising.  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C).  
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serving its intended purpose, then it can and should be characterized as “generic”—it is 
not functioning as a trademark.  If the word or term is functioning as a trademark—i.e., a 
source-identifier—then the court should examine whether extending trademark protection 
to the word or term would have an unacceptable impact on competition.  If so, then 
regardless of whether the mark has acquired distinctiveness, it should be deemed generic 
and hence unprotectable.  Such a system would better protect the rights and interests of 
both trademark holders and the public.  
 
A. The Consumer Perspective:  Interpreting Primary Significance and 
Secondary Meaning 
 
The first step in determining whether a putative trademark is “generic” should be 
to determine whether it acts as a source identifier in the relevant commercial context.  In 
other words, is it distinctive, or (in the case of arguably descriptive terms) has it acquired 
secondary meaning?  If the answer is “no,” then the term cannot be a trademark.  As 
Judge Learned Hand stated in the Bayer case: 
The single question. . . in all these cases, is merely one of fact:  What do 
the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are 
contending?  If they understand by it only the kind of goods sold, then. . .  
it makes no difference whatever what efforts the plaintiff has made to get 
them to understand more.  He has failed . . . .258 
Terms that do not satisfy this basic purpose should not be protected as trademarks.  
Absent an unacceptable impact on competition, however, those that do serve this function 
should be treated as marks.     
 
258 Id. at 509. 
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As discussed earlier, current doctrine holds that, if a term denotes a product class 
(i.e., a genus), then it is “generic” even if it is functioning as a source identifier.  In such 
cases, the term is said to have acquired only “de facto” secondary meaning, and hence 
cannot be protected as a trademark.259 As at least one court has recognized (although it 
was reversed), the idea that a term can be declared “generic” even though its “primary 
significance” in the minds of the consuming public is that of a source identifier is 
somewhat illogical: 
If the acid test of a symbol's capacity to differentiate is public perception, 
then the process of labeling for purposes of protectability cannot be 
undertaken without reference to that perception. [ ] To label a word or 
logo ‘generic’ in the face of the admitted presence of secondary meaning 
is to assert that every word has some absolute, inherently correct 
characterization that the law will discern without regard to what the public 
may think the word means.260 
The modern concept of “de facto” secondary meaning is also inconsistent with the 
original understanding of genericism, as derived from the common law of unfair 
competition.  This body of law protected words or phrases that were not considered 
technical trademarks from infringement, but only if they had acquired distinctiveness, or 
secondary meaning.261 Under the common law, the key question was whether the term at 
issue had acquired secondary meaning—in other words, whether its “primary 
significance” to the consumer had become that of a source identifier; if it had not, the 
term was not entitled to protection from infringement.262 In other words, at least with 
regard to terms that were not arbitrary or fanciful, the questions of genericism (i.e., 
unprotectability) and secondary meaning were not separately analyzed; they were 
 
259 See note 188 and accompanying text, supra.
260 Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906-07 (D.R.I. 1980); rev’d, 655 F.2d 
5 (1st Cir. 1981). 
261 See note 99 and accompanying text, supra. 
262 See note 155 and accompanying text, supra. 
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effectively one and the same.  For all of these reasons, we argue that modern courts 
should also turn their attention to “secondary meaning” or distinctiveness as the first step 
in determining the “primary significance” of a given term. 
 
1. The problem of the hybrid mark 
 
When, as was the case in Bayer, the court determines that the consuming public 
ascribes no source-identifying significance to the term at issue, the inquiry is a relatively 
simple one:  the term is not a trademark.  However, most cases are not so easy.  As 
discussed previously, trademarks (at least the most famous ones) are like most words, in 
that they typically have more than one meaning.  These “hybrid terms,” as Folsom and 
Teply have described them, “perform a variety of informational functions—ranging from 
the provision of pure commercial or source-related information to the provision of pure 
generic or product-category information—at the same time.”263 In other words, different 
consumers may understand a trademark to mean different things, and/or a single 
consumer may apply multiples meanings to the same trademark, depending on the 
context in which it is used.264 When determining whether a term is generic, the court 
should focus on the “primary significance” of the term to the consumer in a commercial 
context, and should give little weight to evidence of uses outside that context.265 
We argue that the all-or-nothing approach, which suggests that consumers take a 
term to signify primarily either a source or, if not a source, a product class, fails to 
 
263 Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1339. 
264 Id.
265 This statement is not to say that expressive uses do not impact language and potentially the trademark 
itself. Rather, as discussed below, those uses and impacts are better addressed under a competition analysis. 
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capture the way in which terms actually function.  In fact, the “primary significance” to 
the consumer shifts depending on the context in which the term is used.  In other words, 
the fact that the public may use trademarks in a non-trademark manner does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that such uses harm the trademark and/or the policies 
of increasing economic efficiency and consumer protection that lie at the core of classic 
trademark doctrine.266 Moreover, these other, “expressive” uses of trademarks have 
inherent value, and the public’s right and ability to use trademarks in such ways should 
not be stymied or quashed, as is often the case today.267 
For example, KLEENEX is a trademark that is widely considered to be borderline 
generic.  Yet, even though this mark has a widely-understood “generic” meaning that is 
arguably the “primary significance” of the term, there is evidence that it also functions as 
a source identifier, in the proper context.  Consider that a person with a cold can walk 
into a colleague’s office, ask for a “kleenex” and be handed a tissue but not a Kleenex®-
brand tissue.  At that moment the person with the runny nose is likely to accept the tissue 
offered without complaining or caring about the brand.  When that same person is in a 
supermarket, however, she may certainly care whether she buys Kleenex® versus Puffs®
brand facial tissue, due to her experience with the brands’ relative softness or thickness.  
Indeed, she might be confused if a box of facial tissue were labeled “Puffs Kleenex.”  
The key question should be whether consumers still perceive KLEENEX as a source-
identifier in the marketplace, not whether they use “kleenex” as a common noun (as they 
undoubtedly do), in other settings. 
 
266 See notes 211-228 and accompanying text, supra. 
267 See notes 229-245 and accompanying text, supra. 
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For similar reasons, the traditional notion that the trademark holder should never 
use her mark as a noun or verb, but only as an adjective with a generic term appended to 
the mark,268 takes an overly constrictive view of the ways in which the public uses 
language.  Although many familiar marketing campaigns, such as “Do you Yahoo!?” and 
“Dude, you’re getting a Dell,” arguably use the respective marks improperly, they do not 
appear to have morphed these marks into generic terms.  For example, the “Dude, you’re 
getting a Dell” campaign has the word computer implied in the statement, but has not 
resulted in consumers saying “Get a Dell” when they really mean to get a Compaq, a 
Gateway, or some other computer.269 Thus, although these trademarks have been used in 
ways that traditionally have been seen as contributing to genericism, that use has not 
confused the public or limited other competitors’ ability to enter the market.  Marketers 
have simply chosen to reflect the way in which people tend to speak.  
Some argue that allowing a company to keep using hybrid terms such as 
KLEENEX as trademarks harms consumers and increases search costs.270 This argument 
can be best understood as a question of the information available to the consumer. In 
theory, experience goods such as toothpaste, mouthwash, clothing, and so on do not pose 
a problem when generic terms are used as trademarks because the consumer will engage 
in the experience at relatively low cost—271e.g., purchase toothpaste, try it out, and 
possibly try another maker’s toothpaste and another’s until she finds the one she likes. In 
 
268 For example, the International Trademark Association explicitly instructs trademark owners not to use 
trademarks as nouns or verb and to always use the trademark with a generic term to avoid possible 
genericide rulings regarding the trademark in question. See Information and publishing FAQ How Do I Use 
a Trademark Properly? available at 
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_simplefaq&task=display&Itemid=0&catid=284&page=1&getc
ontent=5#FAQ75 (last visited June 1, 2006). 
269Similarly, to Yahoo! is likely seen as different from Googling by consumers, in that to Google is to use 
the Google search engine and to Yahoo! is to partake in the range of Yahoo! services.   
270 Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1340-1346. 
271 Id. at 1342. 
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addition, these products are sold in stores where pre-purchase comparison is facilitated 
because the consumer can read labels, examine packaging, and even try the product.272 
When a consumer shops for more expensive and/or less-frequently purchased 
goods (such as a several thousand dollar motorcycle), however, the concern is that the 
information available when shopping for experience goods is not as easily available and 
as such consumers “face either enhanced risks in purchasing the possible substitute or 
increased search costs, unless there is a readily available, reliable means of determining 
whether competing products possess the functional attributes associated with the 
trademarked word.”273 In other words, an uniformed or unsophisticated consumer will be 
likely to over rely on the trademarked generic term and purchase only the mark holder’s 
product rather than a competitor’s equally good product because the consumer will wish 
to stick with the product bearing the generic term she knows.274 
The frequency with which a consumer will be without “readily available, reliable 
means of determining whether competing products possess the functional attributes 
associated with the trademarked word”275 may, however, be diminishing. Given the 
greater availability of information to the consumer from all sides—the Internet, 
television, trade and consumer comparison magazines, the marketer who pursues all these 
avenues as well as employs packaging and placement tactics in stores, and consumer 
awareness of substitute generic products for brand products—consumers are less likely to 
be unarmed as they shop for goods and more likely to be able to use a brand name 
generically in common speech but as a source-identifier when consuming. As such, the 
 
272 Id.
273 Id. at 1343.  
274 Cf. Bartow, supra note 32, at 771 (questioning likelihood of confusion analysis and the way in which 
consumer sophistication is determined). 
275 Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1343. 
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issue raised in allowing one company to claim a term as its trademark is better addressed 
by focusing on the way language evolves and whether the term is necessary for 
competition. 
 
2. The doctrine should recognize and reflect that the meaning of words 
evolves over time 
 
As described above, most words have more than one meaning, and those 
meanings can and will change over time.   A word or term which has no secondary 
meaning may acquire it; a word which has abundant secondary meaning may lose it all.  
The current doctrine, however, largely fails to reflect the fluidity of language.  Under the 
“once generic, always generic” theory, courts refuse to recognize as trademarks source-
identifying terms—even arbitrary ones—that may have been “generic” at some point in 
their life cycle as part of the English language.  The doctrine should not attempt to freeze 
the “primary significance” of a word at a given point in time, as to do so is both artificial 
and inefficient.   
As previously discussed, several courts have held that, if a word or term was used 
generically in the past (usually based on a dictionary definition or some similar source), it 
cannot ever become a valid trademark, at least when the term retains any shred of generic 
meaning.276 However, this approach deviates from the core question of whether the term 
 
276 See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 655 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Where a generic 
association of a word or term has become obsolete and is discoverable only by resort to historical sources 
or dictionaries compiled on historical principles to preserve from oblivion obsolete words, then, from the 
viewpoint of trademark and like law, the word or term is no longer a generic word.”); see also notes 188-
198 and accompanying text, supra. 
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is functioning as a source-identifier in the relevant commercial context and, therefore, 
renders potentially inefficient results.  For that reason, it should be abandoned.   
When a court deems a term generic, based on an understanding of the term that is 
not or is no longer shared by most consumers, such a decision imposes higher search 
costs on the consumer .  In other words, when courts ignore or refuse to recognize the 
“primary significance” of the term in the relevant market, inefficiencies result.  The 
Harley-Davidson v. Grottanelli277 case is a prime example.  There, rather than allow 
consumers to maintain their predominant use of “Hog” as meaning a particular type of 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle, the court held that anyone could use the term to mean large 
motorcycles, based on dictionary definitions and reports in the media that were published 
twenty to fifty years earlier.278 As a result of this decision, consumers may have been 
required to distinguish between Honda Hogs and Harley Hogs, and would likely wonder 
whether Harley-Davidson had entered into joint ventures with those manufacturers.  
Absent competitive necessity, as discussed in the following section, courts should avoid 
increasing consumer search costs and thus undermining the efficiency that is ideally 
embodied in trademarks. 
 
B. The Doctrine Must Focus on Competition 
Once the court has determined that a term has source-identifying significance, the 
court should look to the question of whether according trademark protection to that term 
 
277 Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999). 
278 See note 191 and accompanying text, supra. 
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would have an unacceptable impact on competition.  If so, then the term should be 
deemed generic, regardless of its source-identifying properties: 
Underlying the genericness doctrine is the principle that some terms so directly 
signify the nature of the product that interests of competition demand that other 
producers be able to use them even if terms have or might become identified with 
a source and so acquire ‘de facto’ secondary meaning.279 
If there is only one word or term that the public understands as signifying the product, 
even if they have come to associate that name with a single source, the trademark holder 
should not be able to erect a barrier to entry into the marketplace by preventing her 
competitor from calling the product by its name.  Therefore, the genericide doctrine must 
address the question of when competition requires that a word or term be available for all 
to use. 
 The inquiry that the court should undertake in addressing this question is 
analogous to a determination of functionality in the context of trade dress law.  Trade 
dress (e.g., product packaging or design) may function as a source identifier, just like a 
word mark.280 Functionality renders trade dress unprotectable, much in the same way 
that genericism renders a word mark unprotectable.  The Supreme Court has held that a 
feature of trade dress is “functional” if it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article 
or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”281 More broadly, the Court has held that 
a product feature is functional “if exclusive use of the feature [by the party claiming trade 
dress protection] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
 
279 A. J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 308 (3d Cir. 1986); see also American Cynamid v. 
Connaught Laboratories, Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[c]onsumers will not benefit. . . if 
trademark law prevents competitors from using generic or descriptive terms to inform the public of the 
nature of their product”). 
280 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that trade dress, like a word 
mark, may be inherently distinctive). 
281 Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (same); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 
U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) (same). 
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disadvantage.”282 This broader statement regarding the underlying purpose of the 
functionality doctrine applies equally well in the genericism context:  if granting one 
person the exclusive use of a word or term to identify a good or service puts that person’s 
competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage,” then the courts should 
not grant trademark protection to the term.  In short, it should be considered generic.  
 In the trade dress context, many courts consider the existence of “alternative 
designs” in analyzing the competitive necessity aspect of the functionality doctrine.  If a 
competitor can achieve the same utility as the product feature in question through an 
alternative design, this fact tends to suggest that the feature is not “functional.” 283 
Similarly, courts can and should consider the existence of alternative words to use as 
source identifiers (or lack thereof) in determining whether “competitive necessity” 
renders a word or term generic:  “Whether the term that identifies the product is generic. . 
. depends on the competitors' need to use it.  At the least, if no commonly used alternative 
effectively communicates the same functional information, the term that denotes the 
product is generic.”284 
282 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (citing Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850 n.10).  More recently, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized the “traditional” test of functionality—“essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects 
the cost or quality of the article”—and suggested that the competition-based definition of functionality 
applies primarily in the context of aesthetic functionality.  Traffix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.  
283 See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (discussing 
relevance of the existence of alternative designs to a finding of competitive necessity); Valu Engineering, 
Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (concluding that existence of alternative 
designs is a valid source of evidence in determining functionality).  After the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Traffix, 532 U.S. 23, the circuit courts have split on the continued relevance of alternative designs to a 
determination of functionality. Compare Valu Engineering, 278 F.3d at 1276 (alternative designs may be 
considered as evidence of  non-functionality), with Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 
F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002) (availability of alternative designs is “irrelevant” if feature is functional under 
the “traditional test”). 
284 A. J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 305-06 (citations omitted).  See also Bone, supra note 49, at 2123 
(observing that “if there are many alternative words for firms to use as trademarks, an erroneous decision to 
give a particular firm trademark protection in one such word would not be terribly costly because a 
competitor could easily choose another word for its mark”). 
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Smart producers and marketers already know that they have a duty to develop 
generic alternatives to the trademarks that they attach to their goods and services, 
particularly when they are in a position to achieve market dominance.285 Few companies 
make the mistake that Bayer made in the early 1900’s, when it marketed its new drug 
under the label “Aspirin,” without providing any viable alternative for the consumer to 
identify the drug.286 Thus, TiVo calls its product a DVR.  Kleenex makes facial tissues.  
Xerox sells photocopiers.   
Whether the public is willing to adopt the alternative generic term offered up by 
the producer of the good or service depends in part on the amount of effort put into 
promoting the alternative term and its linguistic desirability.  For example, as is the case 
with Xerox, TiVo, and Kleenex, assuming that these trademarks function as source-
identifiers, the question is whether DVR, facial tissue, and photocopier are viable terms 
to allow for competition.   
While business owners who choose arbitrary or fanciful names for their products 
may be aware of the need to choose a generic alternative, the need to do so when 
choosing a seemingly descriptive name may be less obvious.  In Canfield, for example, 
the product name in question was Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda, a term which was found 
generic.287 While a competitor could make a competing diet soda that also purports to 
taste like chocolate fudge and give it a suggestive (“Diet Fudgilicious”), arbitrary 
(“Purple”) or fanciful (“Zango”) name, using such names would impose a “significant 
 
285 See Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[s]ometimes a trademark 
owner will sponsor a generic term precisely in order to avoid its mark becoming generic. Xerox succeeded 
with ‘copier,’ and ‘Sanka’ was saved from becoming generic by the emergence of ‘decaf’ to denote the 
product of which Sanka was for long the best-known brand.”).   
286 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y.1921) (finding that the consumer had 
“never heard the name ‘acetylsalicylic acid’ as applied to [the drug], and without some education could not 
possibly have kept it in his mind, if he had”). 
287 A. J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d 291. 
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non-reputation-related disadvantage” on the competitor.  Unlike Diet Chocolate Fudge 
Soda, these names (especially the fanciful and arbitrary ones) tell the consumer little to 
nothing about the soda inside the can, and therefore the competitor would have to expend 
considerable resources to educate the consumer about his product, unlike the holder of 
the Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda mark.288 In Canfield, Judge Becker found the Diet 
Chocolate Fudge Soda mark to be generic, because there was no acceptable alternative to 
describe the product:  “Flavors. . . have unique characteristics, and we can imagine no 
term other than ‘chocolate fudge’ that communicates the same functional information, 
namely, that this soda has the taste of chocolate fudge, a particular, full, rich chocolate 
taste.”289 
In short, the putative trademark holder who chooses a descriptive term to label his 
good or service should weigh the issue of available alternatives just as much, if not more, 
than if he had chosen an arbitrary or fanciful mark.  The question that should be asked is 
whether there is another way to describe the product that communicates its attributes just 
as effectively and efficiently.  If not, the business owner or marketer should choose a 
different mark.  Otherwise, the business owner risks a great deal in expending resources 
to acquire secondary meaning that may ultimately be for naught. 
 
C. The Solution in Action 
 
Suppose that a few years from now iPod has been entered into dictionaries as 
meaning any portable multimedia device, appeared in numerous newspaper and journal 
 
288 See Carter, supra note 32, at 770-71 (characterizing descriptive and suggestive marks as “cheaper 
information economizers” and, hence, more efficient); see also note 87 and accompanying text, supra.
289 A. J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 308. 
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articles as a general term for a multimedia device, and has been otherwise used as short-
hand for a portable multimedia device; all despite Apple’s best efforts to persuade 
“lexicographically influential persons” that the term is Apple’s trademark and only 
designates Apple’s portable multimedia device. At such a point, suppose further that 
Walnut, a licensee of Apple’s iPod platform and maker of its own portable multimedia 
device, mismanages its product line such that Apple—as it must, lest it fail to control the 
quality of products associated with its mark and thus lose its trademark290—terminates 
the license agreement. After the end of the relationship Walnut decides to continue 
making its portable multimedia device using a different software platform but calling the 
device Walnut’s iPod.  Apple would have to bring suit to prevent this use and most likely 
Walnut would defend itself in part by claiming that “iPod” had become generic.  
At trial, evidence demonstrates that iPod is a hybrid term, i.e., some use the term 
in a product-category manner, some in a source identifying manner, and some in a 
combination of the previous two manners,291 and that the media has used the term 
generically. Under these facts, despite the varying ways in which the term is used, a court 
would have to find that either the term was generic or not. There is no available middle 
ground. And, under these facts, a court would likely find that the term had become 
generic; that “the trademark was initially an invented term and lost its protection because 
of later public expropriation.”292 
Under our proposed approach, however, a more rational inquiry would follow. 
The court would first examine whether the term iPod had any source identifying qualities. 
 
290 When a trademark holder fails to exert sufficient control over the quality or type of goods manufactured 
by a licensee, the trademark holder has engaged in “naked licensing” and thereby abandons the mark.  
Stanford v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).  
291 Folsom & Teply, supra note 32, at 1339. 
292 Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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If that inquiry failed to demonstrate that iPod retained any level of source identification, 
the inquiry would end because, absent source-identification, the term is not functioning as 
a trademark. If, however, source identification were found, the court would examine 
whether the competitors required the term to enter and compete in the market. The 
defendant would bear the burden of showing that there was no other commercially viable 
way in which to refer to a given product.  
Given that multimedia player or MMP are available alternative terms to iPod, a 
court should rule that iPod was not necessary to facilitate competition. The analysis is the 
same when considering descriptive terms that have acquired secondary meaning, such as 
Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda. In cases of this sort, the trademark holder has chosen to use 
terms that are more open to challenge on competitive necessity grounds. The trademark 
may have acquired secondary meaning, but when the terms are the essence of the idea of 
the product such that alternative terms are not available, the trademark will be ceded so 
that competitors may enter the market fairly. This approach requires that trademark 
holder choose marks carefully and deploy terms to allow competition. Yet that is a result 
that we should foster. For, as Judge Hand noted, a trademark is not supposed to be a 
monopoly eliminating competition; rather it is supposed to enhance the marketplace and 
protect the consumer. As such, whoever seeks the benefits of trademark status must then 
expend some resources to develop terms that also allow competition. Such a requirement 
would add some small cost to the trademark beneficiary, but it is a task that fits easily 
within the marketing department.293 Moreover, society will gain two terms rather than 
one.294 More importantly, from an efficiency standpoint, it fosters competition and 
 
293 See Dreyfuss, supra note 10 at 416-417. 
294 Id. at 419. 
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reduces the potential for long-term costs, such as enforcement campaigns of questionable 
usefulness and the possibility that a competitor could invalidate the mark. 
 
Conclusion 
Current genericism doctrine requires an all-or-nothing, static approach to 
understanding how a term functions in society.  In analyzing whether a term is 
protectable, courts traditionally look first to the term’s status:  is it generic or not, i.e., is 
its “primary significance” that of a product class (genus) or of a particular product 
(species)?  Courts often determine that significance by focusing on the way in which the 
term is used in noncommercial, public contexts such as newspapers and dictionaries. We 
disagree with this approach. 
 First, marks (at least the most famous ones) rarely function in a purely source-
identifying manner. Rather, such marks tend to have a hybrid nature whereby they have 
multiple meanings, often to the same person, depending on the context in which they are 
used.  To determine whether the term is functioning as a valid trademark, the courts 
should focus on its “primary significance” in the commercial context, recognizing that 
the term may have additional, “generic” meanings as well.   
Second, the current doctrine’s approach, which relies on an overly broad scope of 
evidence in deeming a trademark generic, forces irrational behaviors on the part of mark 
holders in that they must expend resources trying to persuade the media, dictionaries, and 
others from making fair use of their marks.  Thus, mark holders waste resources trying to 
influence actors over whom they have no right or ability to control (through “education,” 
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bullying, and, in some cases, litigation), rather than spending those resources more 
efficiently elsewhere and/or cutting the cost of their goods or services.  
 A rational genericide doctrine should focus on two basic questions, recognizing 
that the answers to those questions may and likely will change as language evolves:  (1) 
(1) Does the mark function as a source identifier i.e., what is its primary significance in 
the relevant marketplace?; and (2) Would protecting the term as a trademark impose a 
“significant non-reputation-related disadvantage” on competitors?  Such a doctrine would 
strike a better balance between the significant interests that both trademark holders and 
the public have in this fundamental struggle over the meaning and right to use language. 
